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CRIMINAL LAW
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
AND THE RESTITUTION REVOLUTION
CORTNEY E. LOLLAR *
Victims of child pornography are now successfully seeking restitution
from defendants convicted of watching and trading their images.
Restitution in child pornography cases, however, represents a dramatic
departure from traditional concepts of restitution. This Article offers the
first critique of this restitution revolution. Traditional restitution is
grounded in notions of unjust enrichment and seeks to restore the economic
status quo between parties by requiring disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.
The restitution being ordered in increasing numbers of child pornography
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cases does not serve this purpose. Instead, child pornography victims are
receiving restitution simply for having their images viewed. This royaltytype approach to restitution amounts to a criminal version of damages for
pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. To justify this
transformation of restitution, courts have come to rely on several
commonly accepted, but flawed, theories about the impact of child
pornography. Because these theories are unsupported by social science or
law, they divert attention from remedies that could better alleviate the
harms of child pornography. Rather than encouraging victims to move
forward with their lives, restitution roots them in their abuse experience,
potentially causing additional psychological harm. Restitution in its new
form also allows the criminal justice system to be a state-sponsored vehicle
for personal vengeance. This Article calls for an end to the restitution
revolution and proposes several alternative approaches that better identify
and address the consequences of child pornography.
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INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing a restitution revolution. Traditionally, restitution
has been a legal mechanism used to disgorge a person’s ill-gotten gains,
thereby preventing the beneficiary’s unjust enrichment at another’s
expense. Until four years ago, restitution was ordered in criminal cases
only when a defendant was the direct source of harm to the victim or the
victim’s property. In the context of child pornography, the only offenders
ordered to pay restitution were those who had documented their own sexual
abuse of children, thereby creating the pornography. Victims did not seek
restitution from viewers and traders of child pornography, who did not
participate in the actual abuse and thus did not directly harm the children
depicted. Since 2008, however, restitution in the child pornography
context has expanded to become the criminal law’s version of civil
damages, with judges instead of juries imposing what amounts to emotional
damages for pain and suffering and hedonic damages for loss of enjoyment
of life.
In 2008, James Marsh, representing a nineteen-year-old named Amy,1
became the first lawyer to seek restitution from a “non-contact” defendant,
someone who possessed and distributed child pornography but did not
create it. The defendant, Alan Hesketh, downloaded 1,981 images of child
pornography from the Internet; four were photographs of Amy. Amy’s
uncle had sexually abused her from the ages of four to nine, videotaped the
abuse, and then provided those images to an acquaintance. 2 The images of
her abuse, known in the world of child pornography as the “Misty” series,
have been actively traded on the Internet since 1998, the year Amy’s uncle
was arrested. 3 Amy’s uncle pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of
sexual exploitation of children and was ordered to pay $1,125 in restitution
to Amy. 4 Ten years later, Amy sought $3.4 million in restitution from
Hesketh. 5
1

Amy is not her real name but the pseudonym she has adopted for court filings and
hearings.
2
Warren Richey, A Bold Gambit to Reduce Demand for Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SCI.
M ONITOR, Aug. 8, 2009, at 4.
3
John Schwartz, Court Rejects Restitution for Victim in Porn Case, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 9,
2011, at A20.
4
Amy was around ten years old at the time, so the court ordered the money to be paid to
Amy’s family on her behalf. See Judgment and Commitment Order at 4, United States v.
Zebroski, No. 3:98CR00243 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1999) (ordering $1,125 to the victim’s
parents).
5
Cf. Emily Bazelon, Money Is No Cure, N.Y. T IMES M AG ., Jan. 27, 2013, at 22, 27;
Schwartz, supra note 3, at A20; John Schwartz, Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution at
a Price Set by the Victim, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A19 [hereinafter Schwartz,
Pornography].

346

CORTNEY LOLLAR

[Vol. 103

In advocating for Hesketh to pay a far greater amount of restitution
than Amy’s uncle had, Marsh challenged the generally accepted distinction
between a “hands-on” or “contact” offense, such as the sexual exploitation
of children, and a non-contact offense, such as the downloading, viewing,
or trading of pornography. He asserted that “there is no distinction
between . . . what everyone calls a ‘hands on crime’ and what the defendant
has been convicted of and, in fact . . . in many ways the actual propagation,
distribution, receipt, trading and profiting off of child pornography is worse
than the actual hands on crime.” 6
Since Hesketh’s case, Marsh and at least two other attorneys
representing other young women have filed hundreds of restitution requests
with prosecutors across the country in cases involving the possession and
receipt of child pornography. 7 In contrast, such restitution requests are
rarely being made of defendants who sexually abuse children. Courts are
divided as to whether restitution is appropriate in non-contact child
pornography cases and, if so, how to quantify the harm caused by the
defendants. At the heart of this divide lies a fundamental disagreement
about the harms caused by viewing and trading child pornography and the
functions of restitution.
Restitution is being imposed in the non-contact child pornography
context not as disgorgement of unlawful economic gains, but as a punitive
mechanism of compensation for emotional, psychological, and hedonic
losses in a manner resembling civil damages. Restitution is being used to
punish the defendant for the fact that child pornography continues to
circulate against the young woman’s wishes by requiring him8 to
6

Transcript of Restitution Hearing at 43, United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165
(D. Conn. M ay 5, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh]. The judge
ordered Hesketh to pay $200,000 in restitution. Id. at 47.
7
See Al Baker, In Court, a Victim Gives Voice to Sex Abuse, N.Y. T IMES, June 10, 2011,
at A23; Bazelon, supra note 5, at 28; see also United States v. Breisacher, No. 11338(AET), 2012 WL 2789065, at *4 (D.N.J. July 6, 2012) (discussing requests for
restitution from counsel for four individuals: Amy, Vicky, Cindy, and L.S).
8
Statistically, almost all documented viewers and traders of child pornography are men,
and more than half of the individuals depicted in child pornography are girls. See, e.g.,
RICHARD WORTLEY & STEP HEN SMALLBONE , CMTY . ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP ’T
OF J USTICE , N O . 41, CHILD P ORNOGRAP HY ON THE INTERNET 13 (2006) (stating that the
average profile of child pornography viewer is white male); Jérôme Endrass et al., The
Consumption of Internet Child Pornography and Violent and Sex Offending, 9 BM C
PSYCHIATRY 43, 44 (2009); Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. LJ.
357, 362, 381–82 (2006) (explaining that male-perpetrator–female-victim model that
informs statutory rape law is historically accurate); M ax Taylor et al., Child Pornography,
the Internet and Offending, ISUM A: CAN . J. POL ’Y RES., Summer 2001, at 94, 96. Although
exceptions exist and are increasing daily, see id., given the prevalence of male defendants in
possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography cases, and girls depicted in child
pornography, this Article will refer to child pornography viewers and defendants as male

2013]

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY & RESTITUTION

347

compensate the victim for a lifetime of pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life. The criminal justice system is aimed at punishing and
deterring conduct deemed threatening to society as a whole. Yet this
method of imposing restitution in non-contact child pornography cases has
begun to transform criminal law into a tool aimed at using punishment to
vindicate individual emotional and psychological losses. Instead of
focusing on conduct affecting society at large, the restitution imposed in
this context punishes those who emotionally injure victims by obtaining,
viewing, and sharing child pornography images. Allowing personal
vindication to be a goal of restitution undermines the traditional distinction
between civil and criminal law, positioning the criminal justice system as a
tool for personal retribution rather than societal protection.
Asserting that it should be used only to counter unjust enrichment, this
Article argues that restitution is inappropriate in non-contact child
pornography cases and that it has the potential to harm the victims it is
intended to serve. In so doing, it challenges the generally accepted theories
of the ongoing harms caused by child pornography and the role that
restitution currently plays in addressing those harms. In making restitution
awards, courts tend to conflate a defendant’s interest in child pornography
with a desire to sexually abuse children. Such assumptions are inconsistent
with recent social science literature, which indicates the consumption of
child pornography in and of itself is not a risk factor for committing handson sexual abuse of children. Rather, the average child pornography viewer
is educated, employed, prominent in his community, and has no criminal
record. Among those who have been convicted of possessing and trading
child pornography are an Air Force captain, the head enforcement officer
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a law professor, and a judge. 9
By equating child sexual abuse with the viewing of child pornography,
Congress and courts have shifted the legal and public focus toward
voyeurs, who generally do not participate in the sexual abuse of children,
and away from family members and family friends, who are the most
common child sex abusers. This misdirected focus is revealed by the fact
that punishments for child pornography offenders are often far greater than
those for sexual abusers, and restitution is rarely sought from those who
sexually abuse children. Imposing restitution on individuals unknown to
the child contributes to the perpetuation of the “stranger-danger” myth by
focusing on unfamiliar individuals who view child pornography rather than
those intimate members of the child’s inner circle who create it.
As a result of a faulty perception of child pornography’s harms and the
and child victims as female.
9
See infra Part II.A.2.
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inventive (mis)use of criminal restitution aimed at meeting those
misidentified harms, restitution imposed in the child pornography context
not only fails to alleviate the harms attributed to non-contact offenders, it
also may be detrimental to the young women depicted therein. The
methods courts use for calculating restitution run the gamut and often are
based on a court’s conclusory judgment that the amount imposed is
“reasonable.” As a result, restitution orders rarely correlate to a specific,
proven monetary loss.
Instead, judges in essence are reflexively
compensating the young women for their lost innocence, thereby further
commodifying the sexual acts in which they involuntarily participated.
Courts aim to make the young women whole by ordering defendants to pay
them for those sexual acts. Restitution in the child pornography context
has come to resemble a royalty-based compensation scheme for victims.
Restitution, as revealed in the child pornography context, also
represents an end run around the tort process by conflating civil tort
damages with criminal restitution. Instead of using restitution to rectify
unjust enrichment, courts imposing restitution in non-contact child
pornography cases are using it as a de facto retributive mechanism. 10
Judges order reimbursement for future psychological treatment and future
lost wages based on predictions about a person’s predicted future emotional
state, without any clear correlation between the amount of restitution
imposed and the costs purportedly being reimbursed. Although receiving
damages through the criminal justice process may provide an appealing
alternative to actually having to file a civil action, allowing such untethered
restitution to be ordered as part of a criminal case creates the potential for
misuse of criminal law.
Few contemporary scholars have considered restitution and its proper
role in modern criminal law. Over the past few years, several writers have
explored the role of restitution in the non-contact child pornography
context, but most have limited their analyses to the issue of proximate
cause and a discussion of which legal mechanism is the most appropriate
vehicle through which to compensate child pornography victims. 11 None
10

To be clear, the restitution being requested and ordered is technically for future
therapy and mental health treatment and sometimes future lost wages, but this Article asserts
that, in practice, judges are ordering restitution for purposes that go beyond compensation
for specific ascertainable losses.
11
See, e.g., Ashleigh B. Boe, Note, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring
Defendants Who Possess Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child
Pornography Victims, 86 N.D. L. REV. 205 (2010); Dennis F. DiBari, Note, Restoring
Restitution: The Role of Proximate Causation in Child Pornography Possession Cases
Where Restitution Is Sought, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 297 (2011); Katherine M . Giblin,
Comment, Click, Download, Causation: A Call for Uniformity and Fairness in Awarding
Restitution to Those Victimized by Possessors of Child Pornography, 60 CATH . U. L. REV.
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have sought to reexamine the harms attributed to child pornography and the
extent to which restitution does or does not address those harms. 12
In an effort to fill this gap, this Article reexamines the role of
restitution in child pornography cases and argues that allowing damages to
become interchangeable with restitution encourages restitution to become a
vehicle for retribution, personal vindication, and revenge rather than
reparation. This misuse of restitution, in turn, contributes to an inaccurate
perception of the harms of child pornography, creating circular, selfperpetuating justifications for utilizing restitution in non-contact child
pornography cases. Therefore, courts should not compensate crime victims
for what amounts to emotional damages for future speculative losses.
Part I begins with an examination of the modern history of restitution,
focusing on the past forty years, since restitution became a regular and
requisite part of criminal cases. Revealing a restitution revolution that has
fundamentally changed restitution’s structure and purpose, Part I looks
closely at the requests made for restitution in non-contact child
pornography cases, analyzing and critiquing how courts have considered
this issue over the past several years. Part II takes a fresh look at courts’
1109 (2011); Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal
Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA . L. REV. 1167 (2011); Steven
Joffee, Note, Avenging “Amy”: Compensating Victims of Child Pornography Through 18
U.S.C. § 2259, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 201 (2011); M ichael A. Kaplan, Note,
Mandatory Restitution: Ensuring that Possessors of Child Pornography Pay for Their
Crimes, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531 (2011); Dina M cLeod, Note, Section 2259 Restitution
Claims and Child Pornography Possession, 109 M ICH . L. REV. 1327 (2011); Tyler M orris,
Note, Perverted Justice: Why Courts Are Ruling Against Restitution in Child Pornography
Possession Cases, and How a Victim Compensation Fund Can Fix the Broken Restitution
Framework, 57 VILL . L. REV. 391 (2012); Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are
Owed: Restitution Fees for Victims of Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333
(2011); see also James R. M arsh, Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child
Pornography Victims, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459 (2011).
12
Several articles have challenged some of the underlying assumptions made by courts
in child pornography cases, particularly in the context of sentencing hearings, but none of
those authors has discussed the role that restitution plays, or should play, in child
pornography cases. See M elissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its NetWidening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679 (2012) [hereinafter Hamilton, The Child
Pornography Crusade]; M elissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography
Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN . L. & POL ’Y REV. 545 (2011)
[hereinafter Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing]; Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH . U. L.
REV. 853 (2011); J.J. Prescott, Child Pornography and Community Notification: How an
Attempt to Reduce Crime Can Achieve the Opposite, 24 FED . SENT’G REP . 93 (2011);
SpearIt, Child Pornography Sentencing and Demographic Data: Reforming Through
Research, 24 FED . SENT’G REP . 102 (2011); Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing
for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (2010).
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underlying assumptions in their consideration of restitution in possession,
receipt, and distribution of child pornography cases. Part II then analyzes
the harms attributed to child pornography viewers and proposes that a
flawed perception of those harms has contributed to an ineffective response
to the harms experienced by the young women depicted in the child
pornography. Against the backdrop of the restitution revolution, Part II
also identifies additional harms created by utilizing this new form of
restitution as a remedy in non-contact child pornography cases. Part III
proposes several reforms to restitution that would help it better meet the
harms identified, as well as other reforms aimed at assisting Congress and
courts in responding more precisely to the harms associated with child
pornography and child sexual abuse.
I. RESTITUTION & NON-CONTACT CHILD P ORNOGRAPHY CASES
The last forty years have brought significant changes to the treatment
of restitution in the criminal context, changes that have laid the groundwork
for restitution’s recent expansion into the sphere of non-contact child
pornography cases. Criminal restitution has been utilized to compensate
for an ever-increasing number of emotional and psychological harms,
causing it to go beyond the reimbursement of specific losses and begin to
resemble civil damages. Taking advantage of this broadening scope,
several child pornography victims began to seek restitution for future
therapy and lost wages from individuals whom they had never met, but
who had viewed and possessed pornographic images depicting them. As a
result of these restitution requests, courts have been forced to consider how
restitution might apply in a non-contact child pornography case.
A. A MODERN HISTORY OF RESTITUTION

Traditionally, in both the civil and criminal contexts, restitution has
been used to require one party to disgorge its ill-gotten gains, thereby
preventing the beneficiary’s unjust enrichment at another party’s expense. 13
Distinct from damages, criminal restitution aimed to compensate for actual
documented losses, such as repaying the value of a stolen car or returning
the profits obtained during a burglary. 14 Most restitution schemes required
13

See, e.g., Elmar Weitekamp, Can Restitution Serve as a Reasonable Alternative to
Imprisonment? An Assessment of the Situation in the USA, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON
T RIAL : PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER M EDIATION —INTERNATIONAL
RESEARCH PERSP ECTIVES 81, 82 (Heinz M essmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992) [hereinafter
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON T RIAL ].
14
Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1939) (citing
statutes from D.C., M aryland, and Pennsylvania). Other states had more elaborate
procedures for reparations, requiring an application to the court prior to an order for
restitution being entered. Id. at 1195–96 (citing statutes from Kentucky, Alabama,
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victims to offer proof of the losses prior to receiving reimbursement.
Restitution was used only rarely in criminal sentencing until the later
portion of the twentieth century.
With the advocacy of the growing crime victims’ rights movement of
the 1960s and ’70s, a broader conception of restitution became a standard
part of state and federal criminal justice responses. 15 Many crime victims
felt the criminal justice system was not responsive to their needs, and
compensation through restitution was one in a series of proposals aimed at
including victims in the criminal justice process. 16
The new era for restitution began in 1982, with the passage of the
federal Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). 17 Under the VWPA,
Nebraska, Arkansas, and Delaware); see also Bruce R. Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by
the Criminal Offender to His Victim: Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern
Correctional Process, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 152, 155 (1970); M arvin
E. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 M INN . L. REV. 223,
229 (1965).
15
Lynne Henderson, Commentary, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s
Rights Amendment, 10 ST. T HOMAS L. REV. 579, 581 (1998). Prior to passage of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) in 1982, restitution appeared infrequently in the
criminal context. As of 1925, federal judges were authorized to order restitution only as a
condition of probation and only for the amount of the victim’s actual loss of property or its
equivalent value. Woody R. Clermont, It’s Never Too Late to Make Amends: Two Wrongs
Don’t Protect a Victim’s Right to Restitution, 35 NOVA L. REV. 363, 373 (2011); see also,
e.g., United States v. Boswell, 605 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson,
469 F.2d 368, 369–70 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341–42 (4th
Cir. 1963); cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 240–42 (1970). Under this system, an order for restitution was dependent on the
judicial officer’s determination of a defendant’s ability to pay. Id. By 1939, a few states
also had provisions for restitution in their criminal codes. Note, supra note 14, at 1195.
16
This author’s position on the changes to criminal restitution that arose out of the
victims’ rights movement is not intended to reflect a view on any of the other proposals
advocated for and adopted as part of the broader victims’ rights movement. This Article
does not address the merits of any other proposals adopted as part of that movement.
17
M atthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009). In 1982, President
Reagan’s Task Force on Victims of Crime published its final report, which encouraged
judges to order restitution in “all cases in which the victim has suffered financial loss, unless
they state compelling reasons for a contrary ruling on the record.” PRESIDENT’S T ASK FORCE
ON VICTIMS OF CRIME , F INAL REP ORT 78–79 (1982). In response to the Task Force’s Final
Report, Congress passed the VWPA, which codified numerous recommendations made in
the report. Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature
of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement
Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2722 (2005); Thomas M .
Kelly, Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Victim Restitution and Its
Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 685, 694 (1984); see also Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, sec. 5(a), §§ 3579–80, 96 Stat. 1248,
1253–55 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579–80 (1982)).
Some states had enacted legislation authorizing, and even mandating, restitution prior
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criminal restitution was no longer limited to repaying the victim the value
of money, goods, or services taken from her; “restitution” could now be
ordered as compensation for physical injuries and, as time went on, for
mental injuries and emotional losses. 18 For the first time, under the
VWPA, if the victim suffered bodily injury, the court could order a
defendant to pay for medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment, as
well as to reimburse the victim for wages lost prior to sentencing. 19 In
essence, “restitution” became the criminal version of damages, an equitable
mechanism aimed at compensating victims of all types of crimes for a
broad class of losses.
In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) became the first
federal statute to mandate criminal restitution. This was a change from the
VWPA, which allowed a court to decline ordering restitution based on a
defendant’s indigency. 20
VAWA required convicted defendants to
compensate victims for physical and psychological injuries inflicted as a
result of sex-related and domestic violence crimes, regardless of the
defendant’s financial means. 21 Two years later, Congress extended
to 1982. Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Introduction to RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1,
2–4 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975). Those states included Colorado, Iowa, and
M innesota. Id. In 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration launched pilot
restitution programs in California, Colorado, Oregon, Georgia, M aine, M assachusetts, and
Connecticut. Id. at 4.
18
Neither pain and suffering nor lost wages were compensated under the VWPA. See
Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV.
931, 940 (1984) (“[M ]ost courts limit the award to actual damages directly caused by the
crime. Pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and other unliquidated damages that are
particularly susceptible to arbitrary determination are usually not included in a restitution
order.”); see also United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 600 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Husky, 924 F.2d 223, 225–27 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 833 (1991).
19
18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2), (3) (1982). Future lost wages still were not compensable.
Kelly, supra note 17, at 698 (citing 128 CONG . REC. H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982)
(statement of Rep. M cCollum) (remarking that this would be a “logical limitation on
awarding restitution”)).
In addition to importing civil damages into the scope of losses compensable by
criminal restitution, Congress sought to make it easier for victims to prove civil damages in
civil lawsuits based on the same criminal acts for which a defendant already had been
punished. An additional provision of the VWPA prevented the defendant from “denying the
essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil
proceeding brought . . . by the victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982). Congress’s aim was to
keep a person from having to prove a defendant’s liability a second time as part of a civil
tort suit. S. REP . NO . 97-532, at 32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516. If a
victim received compensation in a civil case, restitution payments could be offset against the
damages ordered. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982); Kelly, supra note 17, at 698.
20
18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982).
21
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322,
sec. 40113(a)(1), § 2248, 108 Stat. 1902, 1904 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2006)).
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mandatory restitution to all “identifiable” victims who have “suffered a
physical injury or pecuniary loss” as a result of a convicted defendant’s
crimes. 22 Those crimes now included crimes of violence, property crimes,
crimes of fraud or deceit, product tampering, and crimes in which a “victim
or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss,” as well as sexrelated and domestic violence crimes. 23 In 2000, certain drug crimes were
added to the list. 24
The choice of the term “restitution” to describe the broader system of
what is actually victim compensation led to what has become an insoluble
confusion between two distinct remedial theories 25 : the traditional view of
restitution requires a defendant to surrender an unjust gain, whereas the
view of restitution that arose during the victims’ rights movement attempts
to make an injured party whole, generally expanding the scope of what is
compensable. Because these two theories had been previously distinct,
many questioned whether the restitution contemplated by these federal
statutes and ordered for victims of an ever-growing list of crimes, including
violent crimes, sex crimes, and drug crimes, could still be considered
restitution.
There remain two opposing schools of thought. One holds that two
distinct types of “restitution” exist and should continue to be considered
distinct from one another: the traditional concept of restitution as
countering unjust enrichment,26 which is now applied almost exclusively in
the civil context, and a separate “restitution” measured by a victim’s
tangible and intangible losses, which compensates for a broader category of
harms and is solely applicable in the criminal context. Proponents of this
view tend to believe that these distinct concepts of civil and criminal
22

M andatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (M VRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 204,
§ 3663A(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 1214, 1229 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B)). See
generally secs. 202, 204 & 205, 110 Stat. at 1227–32 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3556, 3663, 3663A).
23
Pub. L. No. 104-132, secs. 204–05, §§ 3663 & 3663A, 110 Stat. at 1227–32.
24
See M ethamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310,
sec. 3613, § 3663A, 114 Stat. 1227, 1229–30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
If a person leases or rents property for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using
drugs or makes property available for any of those purposes, she can be required to
reimburse the owner of the property for any damage to the property or lost value of the
property caused by the making or selling of drugs there. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2006).
25
See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995);
Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 973, 977–80
(2011) (discussing confusion over what is meant by the term “restitution”).
26
See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 504 (1980) (stating that
restitution prevents unjust enrichment, while torts repair wrongfully inflicted damage).
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restitution appropriately coexist and the designated categories should both
be maintained.
The other approach views restitution as a mechanism to counter unjust
enrichment, believing that it should be treated equivalently in both the civil
and criminal spheres. This perspective asserts that the more recently
created “victim restitution” applied in the criminal context is not true
restitution but a broader theory of compensation more akin to the awarding
of civil damages. 27 As such, this school of thought considers the current
manifestation of criminal “restitution” a misnomer, preferring the term
“victim compensation” as a more accurate description of what legislatures
and courts are calling criminal restitution.
Both of these approaches to restitution continue to have strong
advocates. This Article embraces the latter view, which draws a
fundamental distinction between traditional restitution, which is, at its
essence, disgorgement of an unjust enrichment, and victim compensation,
which aims to “make [a victim] whole” by trying to determine losses in a
manner more akin to civil tort damages. 28 However, the former approach,
delineating a distinct type of criminal “restitution,” continues to
predominate in the legislature and courts, paving the way for Marsh and
Amy to request compensation for future emotional harm in non-contact
child pornography cases. In light of restitution’s ever-widening scope, this
groundbreaking request for reimbursement for future emotional and
hedonic losses no longer seems novel.
B. RESTITUTION IN NON-CONTA CT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASES

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the restitution
revolution for his client’s benefit, in 2008, attorney James Marsh took the
novel step of seeking compensation from a defendant who did not create or
instigate the creation of child pornography in a criminal context. Marsh
began by representing Amy in civil tort suits, but until Alan Hesketh’s case,
27

See Rendleman, supra note 25, at 977.
A similar conversation has taken place in the context of reparations for victims of
international human rights violations, specifically victims of sexual and reproductive
violence. Leading scholars have criticized the traditional approach to harm taken by
national governments and international bodies. Reparations naturally contemplate the
notion of harm in consideration of how to provide adequate redress to victims. However,
recent scholars have discouraged trying to measure harm in order to try to compensate it
proportionally and have suggested using harm as an important first step in determining the
appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Colleen Duggan & Adila Abusharaf, Reparation of Sexual
Violence in Democratic Transitions: The Search for Gender Justice, in T HE HANDBOOK OF
REP ARATIONS 623, 639–41 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006). For a more general discussion of the
challenges associated with compensating for intangible harms, see M ARGARET JANE RADIN ,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 184–205 (1996).
28
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as far as this author has found, neither he nor any other attorney or victim
had sought compensation in the form of restitution from a criminal
defendant who had never met the youth depicted in the child pornography,
never participated in the sexual abuse of her, and, but for the images, had
no idea who she was. Nor had any court awarded restitution in a case
where the defendant did not participate in the actual physical sexual
exploitation of the child. 29 In fact, restitution was rarely imposed even in
cases of direct sexual abuse.
Although restitution had been expanded to apply in the context of an
ever-increasing number of crimes, Marsh was the first to seek restitution in
a case where the harms to the victim were more abstract than the emotional
responses of victims to being physically attacked or raped. Until 2008,
restitution in the criminal context still was ordered primarily in burglary,
robbery, embezzlement, fraud, and arson cases. 30 Restitution’s relatively
29

Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 23, 39; Tasha Kates,
Restitution Sought in Child Porn Cases, DAILY PROGRESS (Charlottesville, Va.), June 1,
2010, at A1; Tim M cGlone, Victim of Child Porn Wants Viewers to Pay, VIRGINIAN -PILOT
(Norfolk), Oct. 25, 2009, at A6. According to M arsh, his decision to seek restitution in the
criminal case was due to the fact that Hesketh was not a U.S. citizen: “We had information
that most of his assets were overseas. We knew a civil case would take two to three years,
so by the time the court would levy any sort of judgment on him, his assets would be out of
our reach.” Kates, supra, at A9; see also Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra
note 6, at 19 (reporting the prosecutor noting her understanding that “it is easier to collect
assets that are based outside of the U.S. through the criminal process than the civil
process”).
30
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.15 (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/1996/TAB-15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_
SENTENCING
Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/1997/TABLE15.pdf;
U.S.
COMM’N , 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (1998), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/1998/
table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.15 (1999), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/1999/table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2000 SOURCEBOOK
OF F EDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2000/table-15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N , 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2001), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2001/
table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.15 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2002/table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2003 SOURCEBOOK
OF F EDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2003/table15.pdf;
U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N , 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2004/
table15pre.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
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infrequent application in cases of violent crime relied on a clear linkage
between the crime itself—an assault committed by a particular defendant,
for example—and the physical and emotional damage caused by that
defendant as a result of their commission of the assault. Seeking restitution
from a defendant who did not actually cause the physical harm or the direct
emotional harm associated with, say, an attempted assault was an entirely
new phenomenon. Even now, restitution is rarely sought from defendants
convicted of sexual abuse or rape.
1. Expanding Restitution
In support of his novel request, Marsh relied on VAWA’s language
requiring federal judges to order, and defendants to pay, restitution to any
victim of a sex or domestic violence offense. 31 The losses outlined in the
statute include costs incurred for medical and mental health services,
physical and occupational therapy, transportation, other costs related to the
investigation or prosecution of the case, lost income, attorneys’ fees, other
fees related to seeking a civil protection order, and “any other losses
STATISTICS § 2, tbl.15 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2005/table15_pre.pdf (containing information through
January 11, 2005, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005)); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS § 3, tbl.15 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_
Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2005/table15_post.pdf
(containing postBooker information); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_
Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2006/table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ,
2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2007/
Table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.15 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/Table15.pdf.
In fiscal year 2010, the categories changed from grouping pornography and
prostitution together—for purposes of considering the percentage of offenders receiving
restitution—to placing child pornography in its own category. The percentage of offenders
sentenced for pornography- and prostitution-related offenses who received a restitution
order in 2009 was 2.9%; in 2010, those convicted of child pornography offenses received
restitution orders 8.3% of the time. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table15.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N , 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.15 (2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/
Table15.pdf.
31
VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 40113, §§ 2248, 2259, 108 Stat. 1902, 1904, 1907
(1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2259 (2006)). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(b)(4)(A) and 18
U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A) both state, “The issuance of a restitution order under this section is
mandatory.”
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suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.” 32
The poor wording of the statute left open the question as to whether
the defendant must have proximately caused all losses claimed or just the
unenumerated “losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the
offense” covered by the catchall provision. Marsh relied on a literal
reading of the statute that did not require all losses to be proximately
caused by the defendant. Only by reading the proximate cause requirement
out of the statute was Marsh able to take this initial and creative step of
arguing that a non-contact child pornography case required restitution.
In the restitution request Marsh submitted to the United States
Attorney’s Office, which took no official position on it,33 he requested
restitution for “lost future income, future wages, future benefits, future
counseling and treatment costs, a reduction in the ‘value of life’ and . . .
attorney’s fees.” 34 According to Marsh, the VAWA provisions require
each defendant to pay Amy the full amount of her losses, regardless of how
those losses are categorized. 35 By Marsh’s reading, “losses” now included
pain and suffering and hedonic damages, including the “full amount” of
losses that might occur at any point in the future, so long as they could be
somehow tied back to the trauma from the offense. Amy’s losses, as
calculated by Marsh’s experts, totaled approximately $3.4 million. 36 This
amount included $2,855,173 for Amy’s future lost wages,37 approximately
32

18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(b)(3), 2259(b)(3). The law also allows for any amount paid to the
victim to be set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages from the
defendant in a civil proceeding. Id. § 3664(j)(2).
33
Despite its purportedly neutral stance, the Government presented a lengthy
memorandum explaining why restitution would be applicable in a case where the defendant
had, as the judge said, “really no contact, and no real knowledge of who the [victims] were,
but was using his thumb drive and his computer” to view images of them. Transcript of
Sentencing Hearing at 11, United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165 (WWE) (D. Conn.
Dec. 7, 2008); Government’s M emorandum Regarding Restitution at 2, United States v.
Hesketh, No. 3:08CR165(WWE) (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Government’s
M emorandum Regarding Restitution, Hesketh].
Included in the Government’s
memorandum was a more detailed argument that § 2259, the provision of VAWA on which
M arsh relied, did not include a proximate cause requirement and thus restitution could be
ordered in any case where a defendant was convicted of “offenses relating to material
involving the sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography.” Government’s
M emorandum Regarding Restitution, Hesketh, supra, at 8–9.
34
Defendant Alan Hesketh’s M emorandum in Opposition to Restitution at 1, United
States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-cr-165 (WWE) (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 2008).
35
Schwartz, Pornography, supra note 5, at A19.
36
Bazelon, supra note 5, at 26.
37
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing request for
future lost wages generally); see also, e.g., United States v. M cGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1265
(11th Cir. 2012) (indicating that economic experts calculated Amy’s future lost wages at
$2,855,173); United States v. Olivieri, No. 09-743 (WHW), 2012 WL 1118763, at *2
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$500,000 for the cost of future treatment and counseling,38 $15,550 in
expert witness fees, and $25,000 for attorneys’ fees 39 According to
Marsh’s reading of VAWA, the defendant did not have to proximately
cause the harm for Amy to recover restitution. 40
Revealing how quickly restitution and damages are exchanged for one
another, the court calculated the restitution in Hesketh’s case by relying on
the value of damages required by Congress in a parallel civil provision, 18
U.S.C. § 2255. Masha’s Law grants damages to people, primarily children,
who suffer from “personal injury” based on sexual exploitation or abuse. 41
Under the civil statute, the injured party can recover the “actual damages
such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee,” with the required minimum value of recovery set at
$150,000. 42 The court found “the civil is a very good guide for the
criminal,” and ordered Hesketh to pay Amy compensation in the amount of
$200,000: $150,000 “in the damage area,” plus attorneys’ and expert
witness fees. 43 Defense counsel argued that the judge needed to “not just
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012) (same).
38
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 10, 41; see also McGarity,
669 F.3d at 1265; Olivieri, 2012 WL 1118763, at *2.
39
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 26–27, 47. Although
medical or psychological treatment at times is not complete by the time of sentencing, the
anticipated future expenses are usually based on a specifically defined course of treatment
and limited to, at most, a few years into the future. Even those with extensive emotional
trauma do not tend to stay in therapy for more than eight or ten years at most. Cf. Jonathan
Alpert, In Therapy Forever? Enough Already, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at SR5. Yet
M arsh was requesting payment for sixty-two years of psychological treatment.
Additionally, even in the civil context, the granting of future lost wages to someone who has
never worked is a highly speculative and controversial inquiry. Given that the young
women were in their late teens/early twenties at the time their requests were filed, the
speculative nature of what each would have done with her life but for her abuse, combined
with the request for payment based on that speculation for forty-plus years of future lost
work, raises further concerns about how far we are willing to continue to extend restitution.
40
18 U.S.C. §§ 2259, 3663 (2006); see also Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh,
supra note 6, at 45–46; Government’s M emorandum Regarding Restitution, Hesketh, supra
note 33, at 8–9.
41
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 25; Government’s
M emorandum Regarding Restitution, Hesketh, supra note 33, at 11.
42
18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Prior to 2006, the minimum amount of damages authorized by
the statute was $50,000; as of 2006, Congress raised it to $150,000. See id. § 2255;
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 25; Government’s
M emorandum Regarding Restitution, Hesketh, supra note 33, at 11.
43
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 26–28, 47. M arsh
concurred with the judge, observing that, in his view, “if you look at restitution and the way
that restitution is viewed around the country, courts do regard it somewhat as a parallel to a
civil suit.” Id. at 41.
After the restitution hearing concluded, but before the court had issued an order
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arbitrarily pick[] a figure,” but “must look at how the victim was hurt,” and
“equate[] it to actual loss.” 44 The judge maintained his order. 45
2. The Landscape After Hesketh
Hundreds of requests for restitution in non-contact child pornography
cases have been submitted since Hesketh’s case. As of February 2010,
Marsh had automated the process of filing such requests and emailed
assistant United States Attorneys in almost 700 cases. 46 Occasionally, a
prosecutor has declined to file one of these requests for restitution, but most
of them do not. 47 As of January 2013, Amy had received approximately
$1.5 million in restitution payments. 48 At least three district courts granted
her restitution in the full $3,000,000-plus amount she requested, although
the court of appeals later vacated one of those orders. 49 Several other
lawyers have joined Marsh in his pursuit for restitution. The other young
woman regularly seeking restitution has been identified as the girl depicted
in the “Vicky” series. 50 Like Amy, Vicky was abused by a family member,
her father, when she was a young child. 51 In cases where her image is
pertaining to the restitution, M r. Hesketh entered into a settlement agreement involving a
cash payment to Amy in the amount of $130,000. Richey, supra note 2, at 5. As a result,
Amy withdrew her request for restitution in the criminal case and the order was never
entered. See Objection to Government’s M otion for Entry of Amended Judgment at 1, 3,
United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08cr165 (WWE) (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2009); see also
Government’s M otion for Entry of Amended Judgment to Reflect Restitution at 2, United
States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08CR165(WWE) (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2009) (indicating that
Hesketh and Amy reached a settlement agreement, and noting that the court had not yet
entered a restitution order in the case).
44
Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 29, 30.
45
Id. at 47.
46
See Schwartz, supra note 3, at A20; Schwartz, Pornography, supra note 5, at A19; see
also Stephanie Barry, Man Gets Prison for Child Porn, REP UBLICAN (Springfield, M ass.),
M ay 27, 2011, at C1; Kates, supra note 29, at A9.
47
Schwartz, Pornography, supra note 5, at A19.
48
M ichael Kunzelman, Court: Child Porn Victims Can Get Restitution, BOSTON .COM
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/2012/10/01/court-child-porn-victimscan-get-restitution/exXeGax7fjOis59exIGQZP/story.html.
49
United States v. M cGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating district
judge’s restitution order of $3,263,758); Restitution Order at 6, United States v. Staples,
No. 09-14017-CR (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009), 2009 WL 2827204 (ordering defendant to pay
restitution in full $3,680,153 amount); see also M ark Reagan, Hedrick’s Sentence: 30 Years
HERALD
(Dec.
20,
2012,
10:43
AM ),
in
Prison,
BROWNSVILLE
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/news/local/article_63e7ea3a-4a5c-11e2-8370-001a4bcf6
878.html (discussing Southern District of Texas’s imposition of $3,388,417 order in Amy’s
favor in the case of United States v. Hedrick).
50
M cGlone, supra note 29, at A6.
51
Op-Ed, More Perverts Face Justice Because of 2 Local Heroes, T RI-CITY HERALD
(Kennewick, Wash.), Apr. 8, 2009, at A8.
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found, Vicky has sought upwards of one million dollars for counseling, lost
wages, “educational costs,” and evidence gathering. 52 At least one district
judge has awarded restitution to her in the requested amount of
$1,010,814. 53 As of June 2011, her lawyer, Carol Hepburn, had filed for
restitution on Vicky’s behalf in more than 200 federal criminal cases. 54
Vicky has recovered more than $271,000. 55 At least one other girl
identified in child pornography images, L.S., has also sought and received
restitution. 56
As a result of the number of requests, federal courts across the country
have had the opportunity to consider the issue of restitution for offenders
convicted of possession, receipt, or distribution of child pornography.
Initially, the critical points of contention among the courts to consider the
issues were two-fold: (1) whether the statute requires the government to
prove the defendant proximately caused the harm to the victim and (2)
whether someone who possesses, receives, or distributes child pornography
has caused, either generally, if the judge reads no proximate cause
requirement into the statute, or proximately, the harm experienced by Amy,
Vicky, or any other individual who is seeking restitution. A clearer
consensus has developed on the first issue,57 but trial and appellate courts
across the country remain split on the second.
Most federal courts have agreed,58 and the government has
52

Baker, supra note 7, at A23.
Petitioner Vicky’s Brief in Defense of the Judgment Below at 10, United States v.
Crawford, No. 11-5544 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 2011), 2011 WL 6018374 [hereinafter Petitioner
Vicky’s Brief].
54
Baker, supra note 7, at A23.
55
Brief of Appellant at 4, United States v. Fast, No. 11-3455 (8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2011),
2011 WL 6779164.
56
See United States v. M ather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 WL 5173029, at *2, *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (referring to restitution request of “L.S.”). As with Amy, L.S. is
also seeking restitution in an amount of more than $3 million. Id. at *4. There are hundreds
of other victims who are notified when child pornography images of them are seized but, to
this author’s knowledge, only four of those victims are consistently seeking restitution.
57
But see In re Amy Unknown, 697 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
58
In fact, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit, every circuit court to consider the issue
has found that 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires a showing of proximate cause. See United States
v. Benoit, No. 12-5013, 2013 WL 1298154, at *13–15 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 2013); United
States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989–91 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d
445, 459 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 96–100 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147
(2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
M onzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535–36 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); United
States v. M cDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122
(3d Cir. 1999). But see In re Amy Unknown, 697 F.3d at 318–29 (holding that the statute
only requires a victim’s injuries to have been the “proximate result” of the defendant’s
53
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conceded,59 that, despite the lack of wording explicitly requiring a showing
that the defendant proximately caused the harm to a person depicted in the
images of child pornography, such a showing is required under VAWA’s
§ 2259. 60 Courts have held that the last phrase of § 2259(b)(3), which
reads “for purposes of this subsection, the term ‘full amount of the victim’s
losses’ includes any costs incurred by the victim for [particular enumerated
losses] and any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of
the offense,” to apply to all the types of losses encompassed by
§ 2259(b)(3). 61
Despite an emerging consensus regarding VAWA’s § 2259 proximate
cause requirement, there remains a significant split on the issue of whether
someone who possesses, trades, or distributes child pornography images,
having had nothing to do with their initial creation or the original abuse of
the child depicted therein, actually has proximately caused the harm for
which the “victim” is seeking restitution. 62 Not surprisingly, courts take
actions).
59
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 8–11, Amy v. M onzel, 132 S. Ct. 756
(2011) (No. 11-85), 2011 WL 4963245.
60
Aumais, 656 F.3d at 153–54; Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260–62 (noting binding precedent
of United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 2259
“incorporates a requirement of proximate causation”)); McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1209;
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 535–36 (citing traditional principles of tort and criminal law, and
concluding that “nothing in the text or structure of § 2259 leads us to conclude that
Congress intended to negate the ordinary requirement of proximate cause”); Crandon, 173
F.3d at 125.
Those courts that find proximate cause is required are split on who is harmed by the
defendant’s conduct: the child sexual abuse victim depicted in the child pornography images
or society as a whole. See M cLeod, supra note 11, at 1350–51. Compare United States v.
Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547–48 (7th Cir. 2001) (child depicted in pornography is victim),
United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999), United States v. Hibbler, 159
F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998), United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930–34 (5th Cir.
1998), United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997), United States v.
Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996), and United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756
(8th Cir. 1992), with Sherman, 268 F.3d at 550–52 (Posner, J., dissenting); United States v.
Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990) (society is victim).
61
See Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152.
62
At the District Court level, see, e.g., United States v. Brannon, No. 4:09-CR-38-RLVWEJ, 2011 WL 2912862 (N.D. Ga. M ay 26, 2011) (proximate cause required and found,
and $3,500 restitution to Vicky ordered); United States v. Lindauer, No. 3:10-cr-00023,
2011 WL 1225992 (W.D. Va. M ar. 30, 2011) (proximate cause required and found, and
$5,448.75 ordered in restitution to Vicky); United States v. Covert, No. 09-332, 2011 WL
134060 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2011) (proximate cause required but no causal link established as
to this defendant, and Amy’s request for restitution denied); United States v. M ather, No.
1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 WL 5173029 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (proximate cause
required and found in the amount of $3,000 per victim); United States v. Brunner, No.
5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (proximate cause required and found,
$1,500 restitution ordered to Vicky; $6,000 to Amy); United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-
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different approaches to what is required to establish proximate cause. In
the Third Circuit, some district courts have found that the defendant must
be a “substantial factor” in the victim’s losses. 63 Other jurisdictions have
employed a test of whether the harm was “generally” or “reasonably
foreseeable” to the defendant. 64
In a 2011 case, the Eleventh Circuit found that possession or
distribution of images of child pornography creates a sufficient causal link
to support orders of restitution against defendants in such cases. 65
Embracing a view of restitution as victim compensation, a panel of that
circuit found that a defendant “harm[s]” the person depicted in the
pornographic images under § 2259 “by possessing images of her sexual
abuse as a minor.” 66 Citing the Supreme Court case New York v. Ferber,67
a case decided in 1982, the same year as the VWPA became law, the panel
concluded that “like the producers and distributors of child pornography,
the possessors of child pornography victimize the children depicted within”
by “enabl[ing] and support[ing] the continued production of child
pornography,” “provid[ing] the economic incentive for the creation and
distribution of the pornography,” and “violat[ing] the child’s privacy by
00293 AWI, 2010 WL 144837 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010) (proximate cause required but none
found as to Amy or Vicky based on defendant’s actions, but $3,000 restitution ordered as to
each defendant); United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (proximate
cause required and found); United States v. Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(proximate cause required but not found as to Vicky or Amy); United States v. Woods, 689
F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (proximate cause required but not established); United
States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. M e. 2009) (proximate cause required but not found
as to defendant in relation to Amy or Vicky); United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (proximate cause required but no
evidence of proximate causation found, so requests for restitution to Amy and Vicky
denied); United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (proximate cause
required but none found as to Amy); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL
4110260 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (“tort-like” proximate cause required and found, and
$3,525 restitution to Vicky ordered); United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL
2827204 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (causation presumed by possessor of child pornography
and restitution ordered to Amy in amount of $3,680,153); United States v. Ferenci, No.
1:08-CR-0414 AWI, 2009 WL 2579102 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (proximate cause
required but insufficient causation established to award restitution to Vicky); United States
v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907 DLJ, 2009 WL 2424673 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (proximate
cause required but no harm caused by defendant, so no restitution ordered to Amy).
63
United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605–14 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
64
United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 659 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Baxter,
394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hagerman, 827 F. Supp. 2d 102,
119 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
65
United States v. M cDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011). But see United States v.
M cGarity, 669 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2012).
66
McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208.
67
458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
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possessing the image.” 68 A later panel of the same circuit, not disputing the
harms of child pornography articulated by the first panel, reached a
different conclusion, determining there was not a sufficient causal link
between the defendant and the harms experienced by Amy to grant the
request for restitution. 69
Likewise, the Second and Ninth Circuits, also adopting a view of
restitution as compensation for harm, have determined there is not a
sufficient link between a person’s possession and distribution of child
pornography and the specific harm to a particular individual depicted in
those images to order restitution. 70 These circuits have found that “the
government must establish a causal connection between the defendant’s
offense and the harm to the victim.” 71 The Ninth Circuit further clarified:
There may be multiple links in the causal chain, but the chain may not extend so far,
in terms of the facts or the time span, as to become unreasonable. . . . [I]t must be a
material and proximate cause, and any subsequent action that contributes to the loss,
72
such as an intervening cause, must be directly related to the defendant’s conduct.

These circuits have identified several ways in which the circulation
and viewing of child pornography images harms the individual depicted
therein, consistent with the view of criminal restitution as compensation for
losses, but have denied restitution to Amy and Vicky because “[the
government] has not introduced any evidence establishing a causal chain
between [the defendant’s] conduct and the specific losses incurred by Amy
and Vicky.” 73 According to these two circuits, and a more recent Eleventh
Circuit panel,74 the Government did not show that the particular
defendant’s actions “in transporting the images caused Amy’s lost income
and loss of enjoyment of life or Amy and Vicky’s future counseling costs,”
nor did it show that “Amy and Vicky could have avoided certain losses had
[the defendant] not transported the images. Indeed, the Government
introduced no evidence that Amy and Vicky were even aware of [the
defendant’s] conduct.” 75 Rather, the courts reasoned, the evidence showed
68

McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208.
This Eleventh Circuit panel found that “not one of the witnesses was capable of
testifying as to the harm caused Amy by Freeman’s possession of pornographic images
memorializing her,” and vacated the restitution order imposed by the district court.
McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1269; see also United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 155–56 (2d
Cir. 2011).
70
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Aumais,
656 F.3d at 155–56 (holding arguably limited to the facts of this specific case).
71
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260.
72
Id. at 1262–63 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Id. at 1263.
74
United States v. M cGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
75
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263.
69
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“only that [the defendant] participated in the audience of persons who
viewed the images of Amy and Vicky,” which was only sufficient to
establish that his actions were “one cause of the generalized harm Amy and
Vicky suffered.” 76
3. How to Calculate Harm
Most judges who have awarded “restitution” in possession and
distribution of child pornography cases have authorized amounts ranging
from $1,000 to $3,000, usually based on less-than-precise judicial
calculations as to the harm a particular defendant has caused, and will
cause, by his possession or distribution of the images. 77 Several courts
have taken a similar approach to the judge in Hesketh, looking to the
parallel civil provision and using the $150,000 minimum figure as a
starting point for calculating restitution. Using this figure, one court in
California has consistently determined that each defendant has been the
proximate cause of roughly 2% of Amy’s harm, and ordered restitution in
the amount of $3,000. 78 Another court calculated that “approximately 146
defendants, including this Defendant, have been successfully prosecuted for
unlawfully possessing or receiving the ‘Vicky’ series.” 79 Therefore, using
simple division, the court quantified that defendant as having caused .68%
of all the harm to Vicky, and ordered $6,636.24 in restitution. 80
Still another court reached $3,000 because the amount was “more than
fair and reasonable” as compensation for eighteen therapy sessions, or one
session a month for one and a half years. 81 The court did not indicate why
76

Id. at 1264 (emphasis added); Aumais, 656 F.3d at 155.
M cGlone, supra note 29, at A6.
78
United States v. M ather, No. 1:09-CR-00412 AWI, 2010 WL 5173029, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2010); United States v. Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414 AWI, 2009 WL 2579102,
at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009). Several other courts have found that “at least fifty
defendants will be subject to restitution for possessing each victim’s images,” and,
consequently, divided the requested restitution amount by fifty when awarding restitution.
United States v. Olivieri, No. 09-743 (WHW), 2012 WL 1118763, at *11–12 (D.N.J. Apr. 3,
2012); see also United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *6 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 24, 2009).
79
United States v. Hagerman, 827 F. Supp. 2d 102, 124 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part,
No. 11-3421-cr, 2012 WL 6621311, at *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (using an approach to
determining a victim’s losses that the appellate court found “reasonable,” despite the fact
that its calculations were overruled); cf. United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 694
(E.D. Tenn. 2012) (overruling parties’ agreement to take this approach to restitution);
United States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-00202-GZS, 2012 WL 1430540, at *6 (D. M e. Apr. 25,
2012) (rejecting this approach, despite prosecutor’s request to use this method for
determining restitution).
80
Hagerman, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
81
United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010).
77

2013]

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY & RESTITUTION

365

this particular defendant should be held responsible for that particular
number of therapy sessions. Other courts also have applied a general rule
of “reasonableness,” and ordered amounts ranging from $3,000 to $6,000. 82
At least two courts have ordered a “nominal” award, one court calling its
$5,000 amount “nominal damages,” 83 and the other calling $100 a
“nominal figure of restitution.” 84 Tellingly, several courts use the terms
“restitution” and “damages” interchangeably. 85
After reviewing the decisions of courts in jurisdictions across the
country, it becomes clear that there is little common logic, method, or
analysis used to calculate restitution in non-contact child pornography
cases. 86 Rather, the opinions suggest that courts are imposing some
nominal compensation in an attempt to remedy the ongoing harms to the
young women depicted in child pornography, harms that the courts
attribute to non-contact defendants.
Yet the harms ascribed to non-contact defendants are inaccurately
attributed, and restitution is not the appropriate remedy for child
pornography’s harms. Restitution’s increasing expansion has unmoored it
from its doctrinal roots. No longer is restitution a disgorgement of profits
wrongfully taken. Instead, restitution has become a broadly applied, illdefined mechanism of compensation for losses both tangible and
82

United States v. Brannon, 476 F. App’x 386, 389 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding, on
average, Vicky had been awarded $2,799.41 per case, and child pornography victims $4,321
per case, and using that as a basis for $3,500 restitution order in this case); United States v.
Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (finding that
defendant was just a small contributor to the overall loss amount); United States v. Hicks,
No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4–6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (finding $3,000 to be
just).
83
United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (declining to award
restitution because the Government did not establish this defendant was proximate cause of
Amy’s harm, but finding the mandatory nature of 18 U.S.C. § 2259 required the payment of
nominal damages).
84
United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 834–35 (W.D. Va. 2010). The court
stated that it was ordering a “nominal figure of restitution in the amount of one hundred
dollars,” but in support of its order, it stated that “the award of one hundred dollars in
restitution comports with the definition and purposes underlying ‘nominal damages’ in the
context of restitution payments.” Id. at 835 n.10.
85
Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 607–09; United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614
(W.D. Pa. 2010).
86
The examples listed in the previous two paragraphs reflect the four most common
approaches to imposing restitution in non-contact child pornography cases: (1) using the
civil remedy from M asha’s Law as a starting point for calculating restitution; (2) imposing
an amount deemed by the court to be “reasonable”; (3) picking some portion of the
restitution sought, such as eighteen therapy sessions, and ordering a particular defendant to
pay that amount without explaining why the defendant would be responsible for that
amount; and (4) dividing the restitution request by the number of defendants convicted of
viewing and trading a particular victim’s image at the time of the sentencing.
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intangible. Non-contact child pornography cases reveal not only how far
removed the current form of restitution is from its conceptual grounding,
but also the harms that can occur when restitution goes beyond its intended
scope.
II. MISGUIDED ATTEM PTS TO ALLEVIATE HARM
Restitution is being ordered in non-contact child pornography cases
based on a flawed perception of the harms of child pornography. Almost
every court summarily concludes, without critical examination, that a
defendant’s possession or distribution of child pornography images causes
at least a generalized harm to the individuals depicted in these images.
Courts rejecting restitution then typically go on to say that the government
has failed to link up the particular defendant to a specific harm or loss
experienced by the victim; courts granting restitution find that defendants,
as viewers of child pornography, are the proximate cause of the articulated
harms. But no court has undertaken the work of examining whether, and to
what extent, the viewing of child pornography actually causes the
generalized harms presumed by the court and whether restitution is the
appropriate mechanism to address those harms. 87 In order to respond
accurately to child pornography’s harms, courts need to reexamine the
assumptions they, and the public in general, are making about the harms of
child pornography.
A. DEBUNKING COMMON THEORIES OF HARM

The harms courts attribute to child pornography are rooted in several
unacknowledged and unchallenged assumptions, all of which were first
articulated in the 1982 Supreme Court case New York v. Ferber. 88 Ferber
was the first case in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
statute “directed at and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving
children.” 89 At issue in Ferber was the constitutionality of a New York
87
As indicated earlier, it is also this author’s view that restitution is being ordered in a
manner inconsistent with its purpose as a legal tool to force the disgorgement of unlawful
profits or gains. See supra Part I.A. Thus, not only are courts relying on a flawed
perception of the harms of child pornography, they are also relying on a flawed
methodology to justify the compensation of child pornography victims. See infra Parts II.A
& II.B.
88
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
89
Id. at 753. The production of child pornography only became a federal crime in 1977,
with the passage of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. See
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE , supra note 8, at 4 (although the authors refer to the act as the
“Sexual Exploitation of Children Act,” it ultimately came into law as the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act); Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child
Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at 549.
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statute prohibiting a person from knowingly promoting a sexual
performance by someone under the age of sixteen by distributing material
that contained such a performance. 90 The defendant, Ferber, was a
bookstore owner who was convicted at trial of selling films of boys
masturbating. 91 On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the
statute on First Amendment grounds. 92 The Court found that the statute
“easily passes [constitutional] muster,” as a state’s interest in “safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling,” and
child pornography is a “category of material outside the protection of the
First Amendment.” 93
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made several assumptions that
lower courts have used to anchor their rulings in the Amy and Vicky
litigations. The most widely cited is the Court’s assertion that because the
materials produced are a “permanent record of the children’s participation,”
“pornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than does
sexual abuse or prostitution.” 94 The Court also invoked tort law, noting
that “[w]hen such performances are recorded and distributed, the child’s
privacy interests are also invaded.” 95 Finally, the Court concluded that
outlawing child pornography is the only way to “halt the exploitation of
children” and effectively control the “market for this material by imposing
severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise
promoting the product.” 96
At the time the Ferber opinion was written, child pornography was a
relatively new concept and, thus, a new research subject. 97 As a result,
90

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.
Id. at 751–52. The individuals depicted in the films were underage boys in this case.
Although, as indicated earlier, the majority of victims depicted in child pornography are
girls, there are increasing numbers of boys depicted as well. Taylor et al., supra note 8, at
96.
92
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752–53.
93
Id. at 756–57, 763.
94
Id. at 759 & n.10 (citations omitted).
95
Id. at 758 n.9 (citations omitted).
96
Id. at 759–60.
97
See Dennis Howitt, Pornography and the Paedophile: Is It Criminogenic?, 68 BRIT. J.
M ED . PSYCHOL . 15, 16 (1995). Production of child pornography only became a federal
crime five years before the Ferber opinion was issued. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law
of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 210–11 (2001). In the initial federal
statute, a minor was defined as sixteen or under. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7, 8 (1978)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (2006)). Concern regarding the sexual exploitation of
children became an increasing public concern only in the 1970s. See Hamilton, The
Efficacy of Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at 549. One prominent study
indicative of the state of research at the time was the final report issued by the Attorney
General’s Commission on Pornography, a commission established by President Ronald
91
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very few studies had been conducted to test the assertions made by the
Ferber Court. Subsequent research challenges the Court’s assumptions,
yet courts and Congress have continued to presume that Ferber’s assertions
reflect the reality of child pornography viewers and victims. Few courts
are undertaking the work of examining the conclusions reached by the
Ferber Court. 98
In particular, courts ordering compensation to child pornography
victims have embraced the Ferber Court’s assertions. Questioning those
assertions therefore casts doubts on the wisdom of ordering restitution.
Most importantly, examining social science research concerning the links
among child sexual abuse, child pornography, and harm reveals that courts’
approaches to restitution have been misguided in many respects.
1. Viewing Child Pornography as the Primary Harm
Courts ordering restitution continue to accept and rely on the narrative
that the circulation of child pornography images, rather than the initial
abuse itself, is the chief harm of child pornography. In fact, this narrative
is at the core of victims’ requests for restitution. As Marsh stated in a
newspaper interview:
“[T]his is an ongoing crime, an ongoing harm, that will never end . . . . There is
nothing that [Amy] can do, or I can do, or the US attorney can do, or anyone in the
world can do to stop this crime . . . . All she wants is for people to stop looking at her
99
and exploiting her over and over again.”

Concentrating on the “permanent record” of abuse, courts conclude
that the possession and sharing of child pornography causes the individual
depicted therein to be revictimized on a daily basis, which is even more
damaging to her than the initial abuse.
Social science challenges this view. It is undisputable that there is
some ongoing emotional harm to individuals depicted in child pornography
images, given that their images are being circulated in the public sphere,
Reagan in 1985. The 1986 report contains “no references to research on the effects [of child
pornography] on children or society,” relying instead on personal opinions of the committee
members.
Id. at 574–75; see also U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , ATTORNEY GENERAL ’S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAP HY : FINAL REPORT 417–18 (1986) (“None of us doubt that child
pornography is extraordinarily harmful both to the children involved and to society . . . .”).
Researchers challenged the social science data and conclusions reached by the committee
almost as soon as the report was made available. In fact, two of the researchers whose work
the committee cited throughout its report in support of its conclusions objected that the
committee’s conclusions did not follow from the data. Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe
Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at 576.
98
District Court Judge Jack Weinstein is one exception. See United States v. C.R., 792
F. Supp. 2d 343, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
99
Richey, supra note 2, at 1.
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where they have no ability to control the dissemination of the images.
However, there is a substantial difference between acknowledging some
degree of harm from the circulation of those images and concluding that the
circulation of those images is more damaging than the actual abuse that led
to the creation of the pornography. The harm of possessing child
pornography is derivative of the harm associated with the child sex abuse
that led to the creation of that pornography. 100 Without the initial abuse,
the circulation of pornographic images would not be so damaging to the
person depicted in those images. 101
A social science approach emphasizes that the best way to address the
harm of child pornography is by treating, and ultimately preventing, the
initial sexual abuse that is filmed. One legal scholar has concluded, “[T]he
principal harm associated with possession of child pornography is the child
sex abuse involved in the creation of the pornographic images.” 102 Yet
courts ordering restitution continue to assume otherwise based on Ferber’s
assertions.
2. Equating Child Pornography Viewers with Hands-On Child Sex Abusers
Courts ordering restitution in non-contact child pornography cases
also embrace the related assumption that child pornography viewers cause
as much harm as child sex abusers. By focusing attention and judicial
resources on the viewers and traders of child pornography, rather than on
the individuals who commit the initial sexual abuse, record it, and then
disseminate the recordings, these courts are contributing to the commonly
held but statistically unfounded fear that the viewers of child pornography
are lurking child sexual predators. This misplaced focus diverts resources
and attention from individuals who pose a greater risk of harming children.
At the heart of this fear is the belief that child pornography viewers are, in
fact, child molesters who use child pornography as a way to whet their
appetites for child sex as they wait for the right opportunity to seduce the
next child who comes along. Moreover, there is fear that such viewers will
use child pornography as a tool in that seduction.
Relying on Ferber, the Supreme Court has continued to explicitly
embrace this conflation of child pornography viewing and child sexual
abuse. The Court stated in Free Speech Coalition that “[p]edophiles might
use the materials to encourage children to participate in sexual activity. A
child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose
100

Hessick, supra note 12, at 869.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this position in the context of virtual
child pornography. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249–51 (2002).
102
Hessick, supra note 12, at 867 (emphasis added).
101
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for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing
depictions of other children ‘having fun’ participating in such activity.” 103
The Court went on to suggest that “pedophiles might ‘whet their own
sexual appetites’ with the pornographic images, ‘thereby increasing the
creation and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and
exploitation of actual children.’” 104
Although the equating of child pornography with the desire to sexually
abuse children is pervasive throughout the legal system and the public
dialogue, many recent studies have confirmed that the consumption of child
pornography in and of itself is not a risk factor for committing hands-on
sex offenses. 105 One psychologist noted that “[t]he harm thesis is usually
expressed in extremely simplistic terms in which it is seen as common
sense that exposure to pornography makes men commit sex crimes.” 106 Yet
viewers of child pornography comprise a small percentage of sex
offenders,107 and several reports suggest that people who have an interest in
103

Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
104
Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
105
David M iddleton, Linkages Between Viewing Indecent Images of Children and
Contact Sexual Abuse: Issues from Research, in RESEARCH FINDINGS ON CHILD ABUSE
IMAGES AND SEXUAL EXP LOITATION OF CHILDREN ONLINE 22, 25 (2009); Andrew Bates &
Caroline M etcalf, A Psychometric Comparison of Internet and Non-Internet Sex Offenders
from a Community Treatment Sample, 13 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 11, 17 (2007); Ian
Alexander Elliott et al., Psychological Profiles of Internet Sexual Offenders: Comparisons
with Contact Sexual Offenders, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE 76, 87–88 (2009); Endrass et al., supra
note 8, at 43; Andreas Frei et al., Pedophilia on the Internet—A Study of 33 Convicted
Offenders in the Canton of Lucerne, 135 SWISS M ED . WKLY . 488, 488, 493 (2005); Jennifer
A. M cCarthy, Internet Sexual Activity: A Comparison Between Contact and Non-Contact
Child Pornography Offenders, 16 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 181, 193 (2010); David L. Riegel,
Letter to the Editor, Effects on Boy-Attracted Pedosexual Males of Viewing Boy Erotica, 33
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004); M ichael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The
Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL
ABUSE : J. RES. & T REATMENT 201, 208 (2005); L. Webb et al., Characteristics of Internet
Child Pornography Offenders: A Comparison with Child Molesters, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 449,
450 (2007); M ichael C. Seto, Assessing the Risk Posed by Child Pornography Offenders 2
(M ar. 9, 2009) (paper prepared for G8 Global Symposium, Univ. of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Apr. 6–7, 2009).
106
Howitt, supra note 97, at 16.
107
John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. T HOMAS L.J. 559, 569
(2006); see also Benjamin Apfelberg et al., A Psychiatric Study of 250 Sex Offenders, 100
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 762, 762 (1944) (noting also the pervasiveness of this conflation of
pornography viewing with hands-on sex offenses: “This attitude has unfortunately extended
to all types of sex offenders, even when little or no injury has been caused to society”);
Endrass et al., supra note 8, at 43; David Finkelhor, The Prevention of Childhood Sexual
Abuse, 19 FUTURE CHILD . 169, 171–72 (2009); Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child
Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at 580–81.
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actual sexual contact with children are not interested in child
pornography. 108 Even studies conducted by the Department of Justice
reluctantly have acknowledged government and law enforcement’s failure
to find a connection between those accused of non-contact child
pornography offenses and actual child abuse. 109
Instead, one of the primary risk factors for committing a hands-on sex
offense is a characteristic shared with some other individuals regularly
involved in the criminal justice system: antisocial orientation. 110
Individuals with antisocial orientations exhibit several common
characteristics, including impulsivity, a history of violating rules, a history
of substance abuse, and unemployment. 111 The other primary risk factor
for hands-on abuse is a heightened, intense, and recurrent sexual interest in
children, known as “pedophilic interest.” 112 These two risk factors are
independent of one another but, when found in conjunction with each other,
are strongly suggestive of the potential for actual child sexual abuse. 113
These two factors are more important determinants of sexual abuse than
child pornography even in the relatively rare scenarios when an interest in
child pornography can be linked to child molestation.
108
Howitt, supra note 97, at 24; Berl Kutchinsky, The Effect of Easy Availability of
Pornography on the Incidence of Sex Crimes: The Danish Experience, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES
163, 177 (1973); see also Adler, supra note 97, at 259 & n.281; M cCarthy, supra note 105,
at 191; Kerry Sheldon & Dennis Howitt, Sexual Fantasy in Paedophile Offenders: Can Any
Model Explain Satisfactorily New Findings from a Study of Internet and Contact Sexual
Offenders?, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL . 137, 151 (2008).
109
See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD , OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION , U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , CHILD PORNOGRAP HY : PATTERNS FROM
NIBRS 6–7 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204911.pdf;
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE , supra note 8, at 13; Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade,
supra note 12, at 1722–23.
110
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Hanson & M onique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender
Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL . 348, 349, 351, 353 (1998); R.
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Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL .
1154, 1158–59 (2005); Leonore M . J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of
Specialization, Mental Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
275, 277–78, 287 (2000); Stinneford, supra note 107, at 571–72; Seto, supra note 105.
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In contrast, most child pornography viewers have little to no prior
criminal involvement and low levels of psychopathy. 114 Unlike child
molesters, child pornography offenders are more empathic, less likely to
engage in sexually risky behaviors, and less likely to maintain offensesupportive attitudes and beliefs. 115 Child pornography defendants also do
not resemble the average criminal defendant. The common consumer of
child pornography is white, male, ages 25–50, highly educated, of aboveaverage intelligence, gainfully employed, and often in a relationship. 116
The “class of offenders” has included a judge,117 the head law enforcement
officer of a federal agency’s regional office,118 military officers,119 a former
Belgian diplomat, sheriff’s deputies, executives of major companies,
physicians,120 lawyers, and law professors. 121
Many child pornography viewers do have tendencies toward
compulsion or addictive behaviors, as revealed through an obsession with
collecting particular images,122 but the motive behind such addictions
typically is not a desire to engage in sex with children. Instead, many
offenders start viewing child pornography because of curiosity or
accidental access,123 as a means to escape into a fantasy world and avoid
114

Seto, supra note 105, at 5; see also M cCarthy, supra note 105, at 189.
Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade, supra note 12, at 1725–26; Seto, supra
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WORTLEY & SMALLBONE , supra note 8, at 14; Barry Blundell et al., Child
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as many of the individuals falling into this profile may have better access to technology.
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real life,124 as a way to facilitate social relationships,125 or as a substitute for
contact offending. 126 Their risk of recidivism is low and their compliance
with postconviction release supervision and treatment is higher than
average, making their prospects for postconviction rehabilitation high. 127
Accordingly, social science studies do not support one of the primary
justifications for restitution—that child pornography is regularly used by
child molesters, including as a way of enticing children into sexual
activity. 128 Although there is still much research to be done on both
consumers of child pornography and child sexual abusers, it is increasingly
clear that the assumptions manifested in statutes, case law, and the popular
imagination are not based in fact.
The law’s misplaced focus on the viewers of child pornography, rather
than the producers, as a significant source of harm to young women is
manifest not just in the restitution context but throughout the criminal
justice system. 129 Comparing the percentage of prosecutions and the length
of sentences imposed on individuals accused and convicted of non-contact
child pornography offenses in relation to those accused and convicted of
sexual abuse of a child is revealing. The mean sentence imposed by federal
judges for offenders convicted of possession, receipt, or distribution of
124

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 33, at 51; Hamilton, The Child
Pornography Crusade, supra note 12, at 1725 (citing Brigitta Surjadi et al., Internet
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child pornography rose from 21 months in 1997 to 92 months in 2008 and
to 118 months in 2010. 130 Meanwhile, the mean federal sentence in 2010
for contact sexual abuse crimes was only 108 months. 131 As such, the
average defendant convicted of possessing child pornography will receive a
longer sentence than a defendant who engaged in repeated sex with a
twelve-year-old girl and a defendant who paid to have a mother hold down
her nine-year-old child while the defendant raped her twice a week for two
years. 132 Indeed, the mean sentence for non-contact child pornography
offenses was even greater than that for manslaughter, robbery, arson and
drug-trafficking offenses. 133 Only murder and kidnapping had greater
mean sentences in federal court. 134 Some of this disparity can be traced to
a 2003 federal law subjecting those convicted of receipt or distribution of
child pornography to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. 135
There is no mandatory minimum for a conviction of sexual abuse of a
minor. 136
State laws similarly treat child pornography possessors more severely
than those who sexually abuse children. 137 Thirty states have increased the
penalties for possession of child pornography since criminalizing it. 138
Twenty-eight of those increases have occurred since 2000, and nineteen
since 2005. 139 A defendant in Arizona was sentenced to 200 years
imprisonment for the possession of twenty images of child pornography—a
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for each individual image, run
consecutively. 140 In protesting the sentence, the defendant argued that
under Arizona law, courts had imposed a fifteen-year sentence on a
130
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defendant who molested a six-year-old girl twice, a twenty-two-month
sentence on a priest who molested an altar boy, and a one-year sentence on
a man who kidnapped and sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl
selling candy door-to-door. 141
The court rejected the defendant’s
analogies. 142
The allocation of resources by federal and state governments also
appears far more focused on stopping the possession and distribution of
images than detecting the abuse that led to the creation of those images. 143
In 2005, the most recent year of a study by the Urban Institute, U.S.
Attorney’s Offices investigated and closed almost three times as many nonproduction child pornography cases than all other child sexual crimes—
including sexual abuse, prostitution, and child sex trafficking—
combined. 144 That same year, almost three-quarters of the federal child
exploitation cases filed by U.S. Attorneys concerned non-production child
pornography offenses. 145 Correspondingly, in 2010, courts sentenced more
than five times the number of federal defendants for non-production child
pornography offenses than for child sexual abuse offenses. 146
3. Ignoring the Reality of Sexual Abuse Within Families
Concentrating on the presumptive harms of child pornography, both in
the restitution context and in the criminal justice system as a whole, has
ramifications that extend beyond the incorrect assumption that child
pornography viewers are also child sexual abusers. By focusing on
individuals who have a relatively small chance of committing hands-on
child sexual abuse, law enforcement officials, judges, and legislators
neglect the far more common scenario in which children are sexually
abused by people they already know. Indeed, the sexual abuse portrayed in
the vast majority of child pornography was committed and filmed by the
child’s father, uncle, family member, or close family friend, i.e., someone
within the child’s circle of trust. 147 As one social science study confirmed,
141
Id. (citing Supplemental Brief for Appellant, Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (No. CR-050101), 2006 WL 1002320, at *1–2).
142
Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (finding no Eighth Amendment violation, but failing to
explicitly address comparative arguments raised in the defense brief).
143
This may be because it is far easier to find and arrest people who are merely viewing
images they have downloaded onto a computer than it is to find the individuals who are
actually sexually abusing children. Law enforcement officials and prosecutors get more
bang for their buck by picking off these easy targets than by expending the resources to
undertake the more difficult task of locating people who are actually molesting children.
144
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145
Id.
146
Id.
147
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“It is the familial and social circumstances of young children that are the
primary factors in their victimization.” 148 Eighty-six percent of child
sexual abuse victims are abused by someone they already know. 149 More
than 96% of child pornography victims already know the person who is
filming and producing the images of their sexual abuse. 150
Instead of addressing the complexities of sexual abuse within families,
the existing approaches to child pornography perpetuate an illusion of the
typical child sex abuser, a “sexual predator” living completely outside of
normal society. 151 In fact, the use of sexual predator language has become
pervasive throughout the legal system in reference to a wide group of
individuals. 152 In 1998, Congress passed a law titled the Protection of
Children from Sexual Predators Act, which, among other things, increased
punishments for all types of child pornography offenses. 153 Various states
and localities also have developed initiatives targeted at this putative
population. In Kansas, the Sexually Violent Predator Act allows for the
civil commitment of members of “an extremely dangerous group” who
have a “mental abnormality or personality disorder” and “are likely to
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.” 154 The California Department of
Justice has a Sexual Predator Apprehension Team, and the Riverside
County Sheriff’s Department has its own Sexual Predator Internet Decoy
Enforcement team. 155
Courts also employ the term sexual predator with regularity, implicitly
keeping the focus on strangers rather than family members. One state court
found the prosecution’s references to a defendant as a “predatory monster,”
“sexual predator,” “child predator,” and “monster” not objectionable
supra note 12, at 1718.
148
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because, according to the court, they represented “reasonable deductions
from the evidence” in a case in which the defendant sexually abused his
children and their friend. 156 Even the Supreme Court has used the term
sexual predators in describing the targets of a group of state sex-offenderrelated statutes. 157
Although in some cases, the use of such terminology may be apt,
legislators, law enforcement officials, and courts use the term to describe a
broad range of behaviors. They lump all sex-related crimes together,
keeping attention on the highly publicized, but rare, instances of child
abduction and stranger rape, as the use of “restitution” reveals. In turn, the
much more common instances of child sexual abuse, those perpetrated
within families, go undetected. As one former FBI agent explained, “[T]he
acquaintance molester, by definition, is one of us. . . . We can not easily
distinguish him from us or identify him by physical traits.” 158 Thus, there
remains a “fundamental barrier” to confronting child sexual abuse: “the
inability to connect a person someone knows and cares for with the
stereotype of the ‘predator’ or ‘monster’ who abuses children.” 159
When ordering the possessors of child pornography to compensate
child sexual abuse victims, courts reinforce the diversion of attention and
resources toward the viewers and traders of child pornography, rather than
challenging legislators and the public to address the much more common,
but messier and more complicated, issues of sexual abuse within families.
Amy’s uncle, who abused her, filmed the abuse, and then disseminated it, is
easily forgotten once those who have viewed the images of her abuse are
ordered to pay her millions of dollars in “restitution” in highly publicized
cases. Through their restitution orders, then, legislators and courts
inadvertently contribute to the danger and potential harm young people face
by reinforcing a predator myth that obscures the reality of most childhood
sexual abuse.
B. RESTITUTION’S POTENTIAL TO CREATE HARM

When imposing restitution in non-contact child pornography cases, the
unsupported assumptions about child pornography producers, viewers, and
156
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victims on which courts rely lead to the risk that they are harming victims
in other ways as well. Because of the way restitution is imposed in child
pornography cases, courts risk further commodifying child pornography
victims through their compensatory awards. The current method of
imposing criminal restitution also challenges the fundamental
underpinnings of the criminal justice system by conflating the
reimbursement of proven losses with the awarding of what amount to civil
damages in a criminal case, leading the criminal justice system to resemble
a state-sponsored system for personal vengeance.
1. The Harm of Ongoing Commodification
Restitution awards may cause harm to the individuals depicted in child
pornography by compensating young women for their images. Restitution
has long been designed to reimburse specific identifiable losses. In the
context of the possession and distribution of child pornography, however,
the benefits are intangible, the losses vague, and the future injuries
speculative. In fact, future injuries may be caused by restitution rather than
alleviated by it.
A closer look at the way victims have sought, and judges have
ordered, restitution in non-contact child pornography cases makes this
clear. Amy has sought future lost wages to the age of 65, mental health
treatment to the age of 81, expert witness fees, and attorneys’ fees, for a
total request of upwards of $3 million. Vicky has sought a little over $1
million in each case to cover tuition payments, lost income for delayed
entry into the work force, rehabilitation counseling for education and career
planning, future lost earnings, future psychological counseling, and
attorneys’ fees. 160 Yet, with a few exceptions, judges have not ordered that
the viewers and traders of child pornography pay the full amount of
restitution requested. As indicated previously, most judges are ordering
compensation averaging $1,000 to $3,000 for a given defendant.
Judges have not articulated how the amount of restitution ordered is
calculated to address the unjust benefit received by the particular viewer of
child pornography, as restitution traditionally requires. In fact, courts do
not conceptualize their awarding of restitution as disgorgement of a profit
or benefit. Rather, courts situate restitution in a modern compensation
framework. Even operating within this framework, judges fail to articulate
a specific harm caused by a particular defendant requiring compensation.
One court awarded $5,000 as a nominal award despite the Government’s
failure to submit “any evidence whatsoever” regarding the amount of
160

Corrected Appendix of Appellant Shawn Crawford vol. 2, at 150–51, United States v.
Crawford, No. 11-5544 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011).
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Amy’s losses attributable to that defendant, noting at the same time that it
had “no doubt” that the award was “less than the actual harm” the
defendant had caused. 161 Another court awarded $3,000 each to Amy and
Vicky. 162 The court settled on this amount because “an amount less than
$3,000 [is] inconsistent with Congress’s findings on the harm to children
victims of child pornography,” but “is a level of restitution that the court is
confident is somewhat less than the actual harm this particular defendant
caused each victim, resolving any due process concerns.” 163
Courts consistently fail to articulate any “benefit” improperly received
by the defendant. In a simple theft or stealing case, there is an object of a
particular value that the victim has lost and the defendant has gained, that
value can be ascertained to a fair degree of accuracy, and the defendant can
be ordered to disgorge the object or the value of the object. But with the
act of viewing or sharing images of sexual abuse, the benefit is intangible,
resulting in no clearly identifiable monetary amount to be disgorged.
By ordering restitution without articulating the nature of the benefit
derived from viewing child pornography, courts appear to be borrowing
from the concept of entertainment royalties, where the presumption is that
consumers derive pleasure from listening to music or viewing films and,
consequently, should pay for the opportunity to experience that pleasure.
With traditional royalties, the author of a particular work can seek payment
for each time a copy of that work is downloaded, viewed, heard, or
distributed, if she has copyrighted or patented it. Likewise, in many states,
people have the right of publicity, also known as the right to one’s image,
and can seek damages if someone uses their images without permission. 164
Restitution in the child pornography context resembles something of a
combination of these two concepts. Courts seem to be ordering defendants
to pay a child pornography victim a nominal fee every time her image is
viewed based on the pleasure they presumably experience from viewing the
image.
This royalties approach does more than commodify victims’ images; it
also commodifies the victims’ lost innocence and virginity. Because they
rarely point to an identifiable loss when ordering “restitution,” courts
appear to be attempting to compensate for the sexual acts in which the
young women unwillingly participated. In essence, judges are paying
young women for each time their image gets viewed or downloaded—
161
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symbolically compensating them for each new “loss of innocence.” In so
doing, judges appear to be commodifying the sex acts in which the young
women participated by placing a monetary value on that lost innocence.
Indeed, it is only by subscribing to a theory that “sex is a commodity, and if
sex is a commodity, then taking it is theft,” 165 that restitution makes sense
in the context of child sexual abuse.
Beyond failing to conform to traditional principles, this approach to
restitution carries the risk of signaling that the value and worth of a young
woman is tied to her body and the sexual acts in which she participated. By
awarding monetary compensation uncorrelated to any specific unlawful
gain or loss, courts continue to send the message to the victim in a child
abuse case that she is valued for her participation in sexual acts. 166
Survivors of child sexual abuse respond to their experiences in different
ways,167 but the current approach to restitution seems to assume that every
young woman portrayed in child pornography can be made whole by being
continually paid for her abuse. 168
Many victims appear to resist this commodification by declining to
seek compensation through restitution. Although there are hundreds of
thousands of child pornography images in circulation and, in accordance
with VAWA, the U.S. Department of Justice notifies hundreds of children
portrayed in those images every time pornography depicting them is
located, only a very few of the individuals depicted—five, to this author’s
knowledge—have come forward to request monetary compensation for
their experiences. There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for this
decision to forego compensation, but one reason may be that many of these
individuals have come to terms with their abuse and are attempting to move
on from a world that values them for the sexual acts they unwittingly
committed. Many highly functional individuals were abused as children,
yet one would never know it from the way they interact in the world. 169
165
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Others are indeed so affected by the abuse that they are never fully able to
recover. There is not necessarily a norm when it comes to survivor
experiences, but the few young women seeking and receiving
compensation through criminal restitution may not be representative of
survivors as a whole.
Nevertheless, these women, whose experiences of recovery seem to be
at one extreme, are defining the current judicial approach to restitution. In
fact, the current system seems to be weighted toward individuals who are
able to “prove” how much pain they are continually experiencing. The
young women seeking restitution must satisfy the court that they have
experienced, and are continuing to experience, sufficient pain to justify
payment of a lifetime of therapy and lost wages. Only if the women can
show they are deeply damaged is restitution granted.
Perversely, such damage may be caused in part by the current state of
the law. For example, according to Amy, the main source of her ongoing
harm is the fact that she is notified every time someone is arrested and
found to be in possession of pornography depicting her. Amy noted in her
Victim Impact Statement:
We now have in our house boxes full of victim notifications from cases all around the
country involving pornographic images of me. Practically every time I’ve went to get
the mail, there have been two or three of these notifications. They are constant
170
reminders of the horrors of my childhood.

Dr. Joyanna Silberg, the psychologist who analyzed Amy, testified at
a sentencing hearing that after her initial treatment:
[Amy] “function[ed] pretty well normally” until she learned that her image was being
traded on the internet, after which she experienced a fear “of being at parties, fear of
being in public gatherings,” and had difficulty coping “with her life because of her
sense of pervasive helplessness” about the fact that people were viewing her
171
image.

The other person involved in many restitution requests, Vicky, also
links her post-traumatic stress disorder, dissociative disorder, and
depression to the notices she began receiving in 2006. 172 Rather than
Rind et al., A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse
Using College Samples, 124 PSYCHOL . BULL . 22, 46 (1998). Rather, family environment
played a much bigger role in explaining adjustment problems that developed. Rind et al.,
supra, at 44.
170
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2011).
171
United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2011).
172
Her evaluating psychologist asserts in court filings that Vicky has been “substantially
re-traumatized, and further injured by the knowledge of the continuing distribution and
viewing of the images of her physical abuse.” Petitioner Vicky’s Brief, supra note 53, at 6.
Vicky attributes the recent deterioration of her mental and emotional health to her
“realization of the widespread proliferation of the images.” Id. As a result, Vicky asked
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helping with the healing process of girls depicted in child pornography,
then, the bombardment of notices may play into their fears that every man
around them watches child pornography and might have seen their
images. 173
These women may be the least equipped to handle restitution’s
ongoing commodification. 174 Money is not going to make the young
women depicted in child pornography emotionally whole or restore what
was lost. Yet by notifying child pornography victims of all known uses of
their images and then ordering compensation, legislators and courts are
reinforcing the message that a young woman’s worth is in her body and is
linked to the sexual acts in which she participates. Given that most of the
young women who are seeking compensation are doing so precisely
because they have not yet come to terms with their traumatic experiences, it
is fair to assume they are the ones who may experience the most damage
from this ongoing commodification. Rather than helping child abuse
victims recover from their trauma, courts and legislators are inadvertently
anchoring them in their abuse experience by keeping their negative sexual
experiences constantly at the forefront. 175 Notification and restitution
reaffirm the damaging messages the young women learned during their
abuse.

that the government notifications go directly to her lawyer. Baker, supra note 7, at A23.
“We don’t receive the notices anymore,” her stepfather wrote in his own victim impact
statement. Id. “The pain and gut-wrenching reminder of receiving enough notices to
overflow a 55-gallon drum is more than my family can take.” Id.
173
In fact, both Amy and Vicky have asserted as much in their court filings.
174
Prior to receiving income from restitution payments, according to journalist Emily
Bazelon, Amy “had never been able to earn a steady paycheck, and the money [a $130,000
check, followed by a $1.2 million check] was a sudden windfall.” Bazelon, supra note 5, at
45. Amy spent the money on a house, a new car, her friends and family, and “shopping
sprees at the mall.” Id. at 45. Less is known about Vicky, but she is in her early twenties,
has had trouble staying in school, and has struggled with what one court termed “severe
behavioral problems.” United States v. M cDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011);
see also Bazelon, supra note 5, at 28, 45–46. Bazelon believes Vicky’s “relationship to her
restitution money is different [than Amy’s], partly because she has received smaller
checks.” Bazelon, supra note 5, at 45–46. Vicky has used the money primarily to pay for
her education. Id. at 46.
175
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 97, at 265 (“Even when a child is pictured as a sexual
victim rather than a sexual siren, the child is still pictured as sexual. Child pornography law
becomes a vast realm of discourse in which the image of the child as sexual is not only
preserved but multiplied.”); Robert Elias, The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk
Dubber’s Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights, 52 BUFF. L.
REV. 225, 244 (2004) (book review) (“The victims’ movement thereby helps preserve
victimhood, thus undermining the victim’s personhood.”).
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2. Criminal Restitution as an End Run Around the Tort System
Beyond commodifying the young women depicted in child
pornography, ordering restitution in the child pornography context allows
the criminal justice system to become a vehicle for personal vengeance and
retribution. Rather than disgorging financial gains, restitution is being used
to compensate child pornography victims for emotional, psychological, and
hedonic losses in a manner that closely resembles civil damages. This
shifting of civil damages into the criminal system may appear to be a
sensitive way to respond to the needs of child pornography victims,176 but
shortcutting the civil system carries systemic consequences that outweigh
any benefits to individual victims.
When ordering the viewers of child pornography to pay restitution,
courts commonly make analogies to civil causes of action, even though
victims of child pornography typically could not prevail in such actions.
Courts, for example, have relied on a privacy theory in support of their
compensation orders, claiming that the distribution of child pornography is
an ongoing violation of the privacy interests of the young women. Yet civil
privacy law does not provide a basis for such a remedy. 177 Rather, the
privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts requires publicity and the
“mass communication” of private, non-newsworthy facts that are highly
offensive to a reasonable person. 178 Viewers of child pornography have not
typically “made public” the images that they view. 179 More recently, courts
176

M arsh represented Amy in civil cases seeking compensation from non-contact child
pornography cases prior to seeking restitution from Hesketh in the criminal context. Kates,
supra note 29, at A9. This suggests that, at least for Amy, civil lawsuits were not overly
onerous. Several courts have positively noted the grafting on of a civil damages process to
criminal sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. M onzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
2011); United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 522–23 (7th Cir. 1999).
177
M ost defendants accused of possession, receipt, or distribution of child pornography
receive or share the images in a manner that does not constitute a violation of privacy under
the tort laws in force in most states. Publicity usually means:
[T ]he matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. . . .
[T ]hus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning [a
person’s] private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
178
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 652D; Neil M . Richards, The Limits of Tort
Privacy, 9 J. T ELECOMM. & HIGH T ECH . L. 357, 366 (2011). Likewise, the tort of portraying
someone in a false light also requires publicity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS
§ 652E.
179
M ost states have recognized privacy torts, and “the overwhelming majority of courts”
have “adopted wholesale” the language outlining these torts from the Restatement and
Professor William Prosser’s seminal Handbook on the Law of Torts. Neil M . Richards &
Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1906
(2010). Using their definition of “publicity,” it is undisputable that whoever initially posted
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have made analogies to defamation180 but it, too, is generally unavailable as
a civil remedy. Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another
by making a false statement 181 to a third party,182 but child pornography
the images of Amy and Vicky and any of the other girls and boys depicted in child
pornography images on the Internet violated their “right to privacy,” as indicated by the
Court in Ferber. It is equally undisputable that the defendants convicted solely of
possessing or receiving child pornography have done nothing to make those images public.
As for those individuals found to have traded or shared—“distributed”—the images already
posted on the Internet, their liability depends on the manner of the dissemination and the
audience it reached. Given that most individuals who are arrested and convicted for
distribution of child pornography are either sending an email to a few individual people with
images attached or communicating with a few specific individuals in an Internet chat room,
Burke et al., supra note 116, at 61, it is likely that few of them would be considered to have
“giv[en] publicity to” the images contained in the child pornography, as required for a
breach of privacy.
The increasing number of defendants who are clicking a mouse once, enabling their
computer to become part of a file-sharing network like Limewire or Gnutella, may have a
harder battle in countering the publicity prong, given that their computers are essentially
opened up for other computers to “see” and access. However, a file-sharing defendant still
might have a solid argument that at this point, the images of Amy and Vicky are already
“matters of public record.” Because these images have been circulating on the World Wide
Web for thirteen years now and have been found in the possession of thousands of people,
what once was private has long since ceased to be so. See, e.g., Doe v. Peterson, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 831, 841–42 (E.D. M ich. 2011); Richards & Solove, supra, at 1920 (citing DANIEL
J. SOLOVE , T HE FUTURE OF REP UTATION : GOSSIP , RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
162–70 (2007), and Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953)). As Amy herself
acknowledges in her victim impact statement, “M y abuse is a public fact.”
180
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court abandoned the privacy argument in
favor of a new theory: the “continued circulation [of this permanent record of a child’s
abuse] itself would harm the child who had participated” because, “[l]ike a defamatory
statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new injury to the child’s
reputation and emotional well-being.” 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002). Although the Court
suggested it was relying on Ferber for its theory, nothing in the referenced footnote alludes
to a defamation theory.
181
Although some might argue that a defamation action could be brought for false
portrayals made in child pornography, such as a child acting as though she is enjoying the
sexual acts when, in fact, she is not, there is little precedent to support such an argument.
The law governing defamation and invasion of privacy is often confused, however, see
Douglass v. Hustler M agazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985); Braun v. Flynt,
726 F.2d 245, 250–52 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Chic M agazine, Inc. v. Braun,
469 U.S. 883 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 652E cmts. b, e, and a strong
argument can be made that the depictions of youth in child pornography place them in a
false light, an element of the tort of invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS
§ 652E. But cf. Faloona v. Hustler M agazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1006–07 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that publication of nude photographs of minors did not constitute invasion of
privacy as portrayal in false light). However, the invasion of privacy tort of placing
someone in a false light still requires publicity, RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 652E &
Reporter’s Note, subjecting such an action to a similar weakness as other invasion of
privacy torts.
182
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS §§ 558, 577. M ost states follow the single

2013]

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY & RESTITUTION

385

generally does not contain false statements or information. Rather, it is a
sad but true documentation of extraordinarily painful and real events.
In fact, the only civil remedy available to most child pornography
victims is a federal civil provision that was created precisely for such
victims. 183 Masha’s Law, which many judges use as a starting point for
calculating criminal restitution in child pornography cases, was created
with the intention of allowing victims to recover damages from individuals
who commit federal child sex offenses, including non-contact child
pornography offenses. Masha’s Law provides that if, as a minor, someone
received a “personal injury” as a result of a federal child sex offense, that
victim can sue in a civil action to recover actual damages and the cost of
the lawsuit, including “reasonable” attorneys’ fees, with the minimum
amount of recovery set at $150,000. 184 Yet victims do not seem to be using
Masha’s Law or any other civil provision to pursue civil remedies. 185
publication rule set forth in Restatement § 577A(3), which states, “Any one edition of a
book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture
or similar aggregate communication is a single publication.” Sapna Kumar, Comment,
Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 642 (2003) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 577A(3)).
183
See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
184
Id. It is worth noting that M asha’s Law assumes factual scenarios parallel to those
experienced by Amy, Vicky, and other victims of child pornography and child sex offenses.
Yet Congress perceived the harm in these and other sexual abuse cases as being
compensable in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, not in the millions. It is hard to
imagine that Congress would set a statutory recovery amount upward of $1 million for every
sexual abuse case. In non-contact child pornography cases, civil damage awards of $1 to
$3.3 million dollars would seem rather disproportionate to the identifiable actual damages
proximately incurred as a result of the actions of viewers and traders.
By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has found that in order to be constitutional,
civil punitive damage awards must be proportional to the actual losses sustained by a
plaintiff. See, e.g., State Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)
(declining to impose a bright-line ratio that a punitive damages award cannot exceed, but
noting that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages . . . will satisfy due process”); BM W of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581–
82 (1996) (suggesting that the relevant ratio between punitive damages and actual damages
should not exceed more than 10 to 1); Pac. M ut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24
(1991) (noting that a punitive damages award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of unconstitutionality).
Likewise, even in the context of defamation suits, which involve harms that arguably
are more similar to those suffered by the victims in possession and distribution of child
pornography cases, courts have held punitive damages must be proportional to actual
damages. See, e.g., In re Perry, 423 B.R. 215, 277 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (stating that
“exemplary damages must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages in order to be
recovered”).
185
But cf. Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 885 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that defense lawyer
who placed photos of minors’ heads on adult pornographic images created child
pornography, allowing parents of the minors to sue the attorney under M asha’s Law).

386

CORTNEY LOLLAR

[Vol. 103

Instead, they appear to be relying on criminal restitution as an easier way to
obtain similar relief.
Consistent with the notion that a victim’s losses must be proven up
front, Masha’s Law only permits victims to claim actual damages, not
nominal damages, damages for pain and suffering, or hedonic damages.
The statute also includes a six-year statute of limitations. Thus, victims
like Amy and Vicky not only would be prevented from recovering anything
beyond the reimbursement of actual losses, but also would be barred from
recovery by the passage of time.
A search of federal case law reveals few published federal cases in
which a non-contact child pornography victim has pursued a lawsuit under
this statutory provision. 186 Although it is possible that the absence of such
cases suggests they were settled out of court, it seems equally likely that
victims are not bringing such suits, for several reasons. As an initial
matter, the statute provides for a fairly limited avenue of recovery, both in
the relatively short statute of limitations and the narrow scope of damages.
When coupled with the fact that victims are currently receiving far greater
compensation by seeking restitution through criminal cases than they
would under Masha’s Law, the civil statute does not provide any
motivation to seek compensation through it. Indeed, given the current use
of restitution as a mechanism to obtain broad compensation for losses that
amount to pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, there is little
reason for victims to rely on civil causes of action to obtain the relief they
are seeking.
Permitting what amounts to a civil claim to be made within the
boundaries of a criminal case has some attraction. 187 First, combining the
186
It appears that several lawsuits were brought under a precursor to M asha’s Law, the
Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, see M arsh, supra note 11, at 474–87, but this
author knows of only one case brought under either law addressing the non-contact child
pornography context addressed here, which appears to have settled. Id. at 485–87. A search
of PACER and the national federal electronic case filing system was unavailing. But see
Boland, 698 F.3d at 880.
187
The advantages and disadvantages of the increasingly blurry distinction between civil
and criminal law has been discussed at length. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The
Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101
YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) [hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms Lost]; Angela P. Harris, Rereading
Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA . L. REV. 1079 (1989);
Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557 (2008); Kenneth M ann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795 (1992); Dan M arkel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); Paul H. Robinson, The CriminalCivil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1996); Jennifer Wriggins,
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two is more efficient; in the words of Judge Richard Posner, it is “a
welcome streamlining of the cumbersome processes of our law.” 188 Rather
than utilizing court resources for both a criminal prosecution and a civil
suit, this “procedural innovation” 189 is a more efficient use of the court
system. 190 Second, and relatedly, using a criminal process to attain civil
remedies saves victims from the harms of multiple court proceedings.
Victims need participate in only one proceeding, the criminal prosecution,
minimizing the potential trauma of reliving abuse experiences repeatedly
throughout several court cases.
Yet despite these appeals, the conflation of criminal and civil remedies
also carries significant, negative ramifications for the criminal justice
system as a whole. Restitution and civil damages have been designed to
achieve fundamentally different purposes. 191 Restitution was designed to
disgorge unlawful benefits; damages were designed to compensate tangible
and intangible losses. Restitution and damages are two sides of the same
coin, but they serve distinct, independent goals. As currently employed,
however, restitution is used to compensate highly emotional losses.
Allowing damages to become interchangeable with restitution encourages
restitution to become a vehicle for moral retribution rather than reparation.
As indicated previously, restitution’s traditional purpose is to disgorge
ill-gotten gains solely in the context of monetary value; it is an equitable
mechanism “concerned only with profitable wrongs.” 192 In contrast,
although some damages in civil cases operate as the converse to traditional
restitution, reimbursing specific and tangible economic losses, most
categories of damages have gone further, compensating a broader range of
harms. Courts in civil cases have long permitted the awarding of
indeterminate damages, which are not susceptible to pecuniary
measurement; nominal damages, which “are designed to vindicate legal
Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL . L. REV. 121 (2001); Grant R. M ainland, Note, A Civil
Jury in Criminal Sentencing: Blakely, Financial Penalties, and the Public Rights Exception
to the Seventh Amendment, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1330 (2006); Note, supra note 14.
188
United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999).
189
Id.
190
Whether this perception of “efficiency” is accurate is not entirely clear. When
restitution was imposed historically, the amount of loss was relatively clear or easily
ascertainable and could be quickly determined by a judge at sentencing. Now, however,
specific detailed judgments have to be made about the quantity of harm attributable to a
particular defendant in scenarios where the mechanism for determining harm is not entirely
clear. The resulting hearings become protracted events, typically requiring numerous
experts and fact witnesses and resembling trials. There is a strong argument that rather than
increasing efficiency, this system actually slows down the efficient administration of justice.
191
United States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994).
192
RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, ch. 5, intro. note
(2011).
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rights ‘without proof of actual injury’”; 193 pain and suffering damages,
which compensate for “physical discomfort, and the emotional response to
the sensation of pain caused by the injury itself”; mental anguish damages,
which compensate for “shock, fright, emotional upset, and/or humiliation”;
and hedonic damages to compensate for “limitations on the injured
person’s ability to participate in and derive pleasure from the normal
activities of daily life, or the individual’s inability to pursue his talents,
recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations.” 194 Civil damages, therefore,
have always gone beyond restoration of financial losses to achieve multiple
forms of vindication.
Criminal law has distanced itself from such forms of personal
vindication and vengeance. Unlike the tort system, which aims to address
personal wrongs, the criminal justice system is aimed at punishing and
deterring conduct deemed morally threatening to society as a whole. 195
Allowing personal vindication to be a goal of restitution undermines this
distinction, positioning the criminal justice system as a tool for personal
retribution. 196 Identifying that danger, one commentator observed:
The concept of justice as retribution is simply too costly to allow it to be a prevalent
response. We encounter injustices daily, in our homes, our places of work, and in the
affairs of nations. We can ill afford to respond to the grievances, large and small, in
ways that are likely to prolong and escalate conflict, perpetuate cycles of
violence. . . . Limiting justice to retribution turns interpersonal disputes into tit-for197
tat feuds and border skirmishes into full-fledged wars.

And until recently, criminal restitution had indeed managed to
maintain its restorative character while staying away from the realm of
vengeance and retribution. 198
193
25 C.J.S. Damages § 14 (2011); see also Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 181 (4th Cir.
2002) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978)).
194
Samuel R. Bagenstos & M argo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND . L. REV. 745, 748 (2007).
195
See, e.g., Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 187, at 1878; M ann, supra note 187, at
1799; Robinson, supra note 187, at 205–07.
196
RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 42, 51 (2011)
(stating that a restitutionary recovery should not have a punitive effect); id. § 51 cmt. k
(stating that “disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive remedy”); Rendleman, supra
note 25, at 998–1005.
197
Dean E. Peachey, Restitution, Reconciliation, Retribution: Identifying the Forms of
Justice People Desire, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON T RIAL , supra note 13, at 551, 556.
198
Supreme Court precedent offers conflicting perspectives as to whether restitution
should be viewed as primarily a restorative or punitive device. Compare Dolan v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539–40 (2010) (“[T]he statute [18 U.S.C. § 3664] seeks primarily
to assure that victims of a crime receive full restitution.”), and Hughey v. United States, 495
U.S. 411, 415–16 (1990) (highlighting VWPA 18 U.S.C. § 3579’s goal of “restoring
someone to a position he occupied before a particular event”), with Pasquantino v. United

2013]

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY & RESTITUTION

389

In the context of morally and emotionally laden child pornography
cases, however, restitution has become inappropriately intertwined with
retribution, moral vindication, and revenge. If, like civil damages,
restitution is permitted to encompass emotional, psychological, and hedonic
losses, as victims’ lawyers seek and many courts have allowed, the
resulting restitution ceases to be a mechanism aimed at financially restoring
child pornography victims. Using restitution to achieve civil damages
more easily punishes the defendant for the fact that child pornography
continues to circulate against the young woman’s wishes. Restitution
therefore achieves retribution and punishment, transforming criminal law
into a tool of personal vengeance.
Courts ordering victim compensation reinforce restitution’s punitive
aspects by engaging in what may be an unconscious redistribution of
wealth. Such redistribution is correlated to race and class, although in a
very different way than usual in the criminal justice system. Unlike the
average criminal defendant 199 and the average child sex abuser,200 noncontact child pornography defendants tend to be educated and employed
white men of above-average intelligence with some financial assets.
Hesketh, for example, was a British national and an executive at a major
drug corporation. 201 Part of Marsh’s admitted motivation for seeking
States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005) (stating that the purpose of restitution is to “mete out
appropriate criminal punishment”), and Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 58 (1986) (stating
that restitution orders are imposed “for the benefit of the State,” specifically the state’s
interests in rehabilitation and punishment).
Federal appellate courts also reflect this inconsistency. Compare United States v.
Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2006) (restitution is criminal penalty), United States v.
Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2006), United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 814
(6th Cir. 2000) (restitution part of criminal sentence), United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d
1256, 1259–61 (11th Cir. 1998) (restitution part of criminal sentence), United States v.
Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 336 (9th Cir. 1993) (restitution part of criminal sentence), United
States v. Rico Indus., Inc., 854 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1988) (restitution is criminal
penalty), United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) (same), and United
States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1987) (restitution fundamentally penal in
nature), with United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2007) (restitution
not punishment), United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (restitution
designed to make victims whole, not to punish), and United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d
531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (restitution not punishment).
199
Researchers estimate that 80%–90% of defendants are indigent. Representation of
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan and Other
States?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Robert C. “Bobby” Scott,
Chairman of the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.).
200
See, e.g., Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade, supra note 12, at 1717–22.
201
Prior to his arrest, Hesketh was vice president and general patent advisor for the
international drug company Pfizer. Defendant Alan Hesketh’s M emorandum in Aid of
Sentencing, United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-cr-165 (WWE) (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 2008).
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criminal restitution from Hesketh was his known assets. 202 Because child
pornography viewers generally have deeper pockets than most offenders,
courts may view restitution as a way of equitably balancing the scales of
justice: restitution punishes the offender for engaging in wrongful pleasure
and compensates the victim for her abuse, even if it was not at the hands of
the defendant. As one scholar noted, “[W]e punish harm not only in order
to express something to the offender and about the offender, but also to
express something to the victim and about the victim to others.” 203 Thus,
this expansion of restitution may be a method of trying to show young
women the criminal justice system is helping restore the balance between
the offender and the crime victim.
Because restitution is being interpreted most broadly in cases
involving child pornography viewers, it appears that economically
advantaged white men are bearing the brunt of restitution’s increasingly
expanded scope in a way that is not doctrinally grounded. Although this
may be a facially appealing turn of events for those who are wary of seeing
poor men of color targeted by the criminal justice system,204 race and class
should not play a role in the meting out of justice, regardless of who the
defendant is. Moreover, the beneficiaries of the restitution revolution are
primarily young white women,205 even though the majority of all crime
victims come from communities of color. 206 Given that violence against
202

Transcript of Restitution Hearing, Hesketh, supra note 6, at 19; Kates, supra note 29,
at A9. As M arsh told a reporter, “[M ]ost of his assets were overseas. We knew a civil case
would take two to three years, so by the time the court would levy any sort of judgment on
him, his assets would be out of our reach.” Kates, supra note 29, at A9.
203
Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 713,
733 (2008).
204
See, e.g., M ICHELLE ALEXANDER, T HE NEW JIM CROW : M ASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
205
The majority of young people depicted in child pornography images are white,
westernized females between the ages of eight and twelve. Ethel Quayle, Abuse Images of
Children: Identifying Gaps in Our Knowledge 13 (April 2009) (paper prepared for G8
Symposium, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Apr. 6–7, 2009). Asian children were a
distant second, and there were very few images of African, African-American, Latino, or
biracial children. Taylor et al., supra note 8, at 96; Quayle, supra, at 13–14.
206
See, e.g., JENNIFER L. T RUMAN & M ICHAEL R. RAND , BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY : CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION ,
2009, at 4–5 (2010) (revealing that black males are victimized at higher rates than whites
and other races, and bi- and multiracial individuals have the highest victimization rates);
M aureen Outlaw et al., Repeat and Multiple Victimizations: The Role of Individual and
Contextual Factors, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 187, 189 (2002); Scott Duke Harris, In Search
of Elusive Justice, L.A. T IMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 18; Sara B. M iller, Shootings Shake a
Community, and Fear Becomes an Accomplice, CHRISTIAN SCI. M ONITOR, Nov. 30, 2004, at
1 (confirming that the majority of crime victims come from the same communities as
perpetrators). A woman’s chances of being raped are greater if she is a woman of color or
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people of color remains regularly marginalized,207 it is unlikely that any
perceived advantages of the restitution revolution will be extended beyond
the context of compensating young “innocent” white girls. Instead, the
new hybrid civil–criminal system of restitution essentially requires middleand upper-class white child pornography viewers to disgorge intangible
benefits by paying young white girls for equally intangible losses.
3. Restitution and Deterrence
Beyond transforming the criminal law into a tool of personal
vindication and vengeance, orders of restitution divert the criminal law
from one of its original and primary purposes: the deterrence of child
sexual abuse, the necessary precursor to child pornography. Compensating
victims through restitution is an easy method of allowing legislators and
judges to feel as though they are doing something useful for the young
women who have suffered abuse: it is a remedy for which victims’ rights
advocates have advocated; it produces a tangible, visible benefit; and it
provides an additional punishment against the general class of “bad actors”
who have some connection to child pornography. Yet by suggesting that
the viewers of child pornography can make victims “whole,” judges and
legislators advocating compensation through restitution shift the focus
away from the perpetrators of the underlying harm to those who can most
easily provide compensation for that harm. The criminal justice system
therefore becomes an efficient purveyor of individual damages but does
relatively little to deter the child sexual abuse depicted in child
pornography.
Courts commonly assert that restitution serves as deterrence by
eliminating the market for child pornography. 208 Although it is too soon to
say whether restitution deters, removing individual child pornography
viewers from the community through the imposition of increasingly harsh
punishments has not led to the elimination or even diminishment of the
child pornography market. Studies have shown that enforcement efforts
aimed at arresting individuals who access but do not manufacture
pornography only target a “small fraction” of actual offenders. 209 Despite
the ever-increasing punishments for child pornography offenses, there is
lives in a large city. Kim Lane Scheppele & Pauline B. Bart, Through Women’s Eyes:
Defining Danger in the Wake of Sexual Assault, 39 J. SOC. ISSUES 63, 65 (1983).
207
Henderson, supra note 15, at 585.
208
See supra Part II.A.
209
Daniel P. M ears et al., Sex Crimes, Children, and Pornography: Public Views and
Public Policy, 54 CRIME & DELINQ . 532, 536 (2008); cf. WORTLEY & SMALLBONE , supra
note 8, at 10 (discussing increasingly sophisticated measures child pornography distributors
are taking in order to elude detection).
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“little or no evidence that this [child-pornography-centered] approach has
yielded the expected deterrence value or has succeeded in protecting
children.” 210
Punitive approaches, such as the imposition of restitution, remain
unlikely to have much impact, given that they do not get at the underlying
sexual abuse that leads to the creation of the pornography. 211 Intrafamily
sexual abuse occurs without regard to the market. 212 If deterrence is the
goal, child sexual abuse, rather than child pornography, should be the focus
of law enforcement efforts, as it is the primary source of harm to the young
women involved. Restitution provides individual damages but not systemic
deterrence.
III. TAILORING REM EDIES TO HARM
The theories of harm attributed to child pornography by the courts and
public at large remain rooted in faulty assumptions. By misidentifying the
harms, courts have misidentified the remedies that will best alleviate, or at
least lessen the impact of, the actual harms. The law’s focus should be on
trying to eliminate instances of child sexual abuse, given that it is the
primary source of harm and a necessary precursor to the production of child
pornography. Advocating the elimination of mandatory restitution, Part III
argues that restitution should only rarely play a role in child pornography
cases because it detracts from identifying and deterring the more pressing
harms of child sexual abuse. Instead, Part III.A suggests that restitution in
child sexual abuse cases be imposed based on an approach grounded in a
theory of unjust enrichment. This Subpart provides concrete suggestions
courts might consider in determining whether restitution is appropriate in a
particular case and, if so, how much to impose. This framework for
restitution would eliminate, or at least lessen, the harms identified in Part II
and better address the underlying harms of sexual abuse. Part III.B then
210

Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade, supra note 12, at 1726; see also
Finkelhor, supra note 107, at 169–77 (noting that, generally, offenders are deterred more by
an increase in the risk of getting caught than by an increase in the severity of likely
punishment).
211
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at
571; cf. United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Iowa 2009). In fact,
Professor Amy Adler argues that the “dramatic expansion of child pornography law may
have unwittingly heightened pedophilic desire,” as the “growth of child pornography law
has opened up a whole arena for the elaborate exploration of children as sexual creatures.”
Adler, supra note 97, at 212, 213.
212
M any child pornography producers create the images for their own pleasure and not
for profit or distribution, meaning that third-party demand does not typically affect the rate
of production. See, e.g., Tess Lopez et al., Trends and Practice Tips for Representing Child
Pornography Offenders at Sentencing, 27 CRIM. JUSTICE 29, 31–32 (2012).
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proposes reshaping the current law so that it targets those individuals who
are more likely to abuse children. In support of this approach, this Subpart
highlights potential changes to statutes and sentencing guidelines that
might help achieve the goal of deterring child sexual abuse and,
consequently, child pornography.
A. RETHINKING RESTITUTION

In light of the potential harms from broadly compensating young
women for the sexual acts they unwillingly committed, restitution is only
appropriate in cases where a defendant has unjustly received a quantifiable
financial benefit from his actions. Under this approach, wrongful pleasure
is not a sufficient “benefit” to justify the disgorgement of some
“reasonable” amount of money. Only when specifically quantified benefits
and harms are identified should the defendant be required to disgorge the
profits and pay restitution to the victim. If restitution can be applied in a
manner consistent with its doctrinal roots, many of the issues arising from
the recent approach to restitution—the misplaced focus on child
pornography instead of sexual abuse, the potential commodification of
young women, and the conflation of restitution and civil damages—could
be eliminated. This Subpart proposes several changes to the current
restitution framework aimed at empowering victims in a more substantive
way.
1. Rejecting the Restitution Revolution
This Article advocates the elimination of mandatory restitution and the
end of criminal restitution as a method of compensating noneconomic
harms. In order to avoid the concerns raised by the current method of
compensating victims, courts should use criminal restitution only to force
the disgorgement of a defendant’s unlawful economic gain, not as a
mechanism for ordering damages for difficult-to-quantify injuries.
Likewise, restitution also should not require the payment of an ungrounded
monetary penalty for the illicit pleasure a defendant received while viewing
a child pornography image. Only by applying restitution in a manner that
requires disgorgement of actual economic gain can courts and legislators
eliminate the potential for restitution to commodify victims and secure
some assurance that criminal law will not become enmeshed in the meting
out of personal vengeance.
To this end, this Subpart suggests a framework courts could utilize
that would avoid the harms laid out in Part II. Rather than always imposing
some type of compensation, as a system with mandatory restitution
arguably might require, judges could make a case-by-case determination.
When considering whether to impose restitution in a sex-related case, a
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court first might evaluate whether the offense conduct resulted in an unjust
enrichment to one party based on an economic loss to another. If a court
determined the unlawful benefit conferred was economic in nature, the
court then could consider employing restitution as a sentencing option. To
determine the appropriate amount of restitution to impose, courts might
require victims to provide proof of financial losses incurred, and draw a
line at reimbursing speculative future losses.
Restitution would still remain appropriate in some distribution of child
pornography cases and in numerous other child sexual abuse scenarios
where the defendant has received an economic unjust enrichment
appropriate for disgorgement under the framework proposed. For example,
if an individual made a financial profit from the sale of child pornography,
an order requiring him to pay restitution in the amount of the profits
received would be an appropriate remedy because the seller made a
concrete and identifiable economic gain from the sale of child pornography
images. In this scenario, the seller would have to give any profits made
from the sale of images back to the victims whose images were sold, as
those profits were unlawfully obtained at the victims’ expense. 213
Likewise, when an individual is directing the actions of an underage
prostitute and then taking the profits, such a scenario might present another
example of when the disgorgement of that profit to a child sexual abuse
victim would balance the financial scales. In a relatively recent federal
case out of the Northern District of Georgia, a defendant was convicted of
crossing interstate lines with a female under the age of eighteen for
purposes of engaging her in prostitution. 214 At sentencing, the Government
requested, and the judge agreed to order, restitution in the amount of the
prostitution services rendered, since the payments had gone to the
defendant instead of the girl being prostituted. 215 The prosecutor calculated
how much, on average, the defendant had charged for the girl’s sexual
213

Arguably, this approach could be extended to computer servers or file-sharing
networks hosting websites containing child pornography. In fact, targeting the individuals
behind these profit-generating networks and requiring them to disgorge the profits made
from providing child pornography to paid subscribers, for example, could be much more
effective in shutting down the transmission of child pornography over the Internet.
214
Government’s Sentencing M emorandum, United States v. Robinson, No. 1:10-CR129 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Government’s Sentencing M emorandum,
Robinson]. The basis for this request is a statutory provision related to human trafficking
and slavery. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1593(a) (2006). The victim of sex trafficking is to be
paid not only the “full amount of [her] losses” but also the greater of the value of the
victim’s services or minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. § 1593(b)(3).
215
Government’s Sentencing M emorandum, Robinson, supra note 214, at 7–8; see also
Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Homer, No. 1:10-cr-00300-ODE-AJB (N.D. Ga. Aug.
16, 2011).
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services, multiplied that by the number of hours and days she had worked,
and reached a monetary figure. The court reasoned that this amount would
restore the young woman financially because it equaled the amount she
would have received for her sexual services in the absence of the
defendant’s role. Although this approach to restitution ignores the fact that
the young woman likely would not have engaged in prostitution but for the
defendant’s coercion, it disgorges from the offender the profits that
rightfully belong to the girl. In other words, it restores the financial
balance between the two parties in a way consistent with restitution’s
purpose, without engaging in speculative compensation for emotional
harms of pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life.
The unjust enrichment in these examples is not emotional or
psychological pleasure; it is actual economic profit. When actual economic
profit is at play, restitution is an appropriate remedy. Although it does not
eliminate all of the commodification issues discussed earlier, because it still
compensates young women for the sex acts they committed, this scheme
does eliminate the suggestion of compensation for lost innocence and the
appearance of awarding royalties-type civil damages in a criminal case.
Employing this approach likely would mean that restitution is rarely
imposed in non-contact child pornography cases, as economic benefits do
not often accrue to the defendant in most possession and receipt cases.
Judges using this system would have a much easier time determining
the amount of restitution to impose. After making an initial determination
that the benefit conferred is economic in nature, judges could rely on a
concrete and consistent method for determining the amount owed, such as
that used to determine loss amounts in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 216
The Sixth Amendment provides another possible method for
determining the amount of economic loss a particular defendant must
reimburse to a victim. Under the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in
Southern Union Company v. United States,217 a strong argument could be
made that the Constitution requires a jury to determine the amount of
restitution to be imposed in a given case. 218 In light of courts’ treatment of
216

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3 (2012).
132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (holding Apprendi applies to criminal fines).
218
Although this Article clearly takes the position that restitution is, and should remain,
a restorative rather than a punitive mechanism, courts are regularly treating restitution as a
punitive device in the child pornography context. See supra Part II.B.2. As such, restitution
appears as though it is being used as a version of the criminal fine—but with the money
going to the victim rather than the state. Unlike a fine, however, criminal restitution is not
subject to the protections of the Sixth Amendment, as articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
217
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criminal restitution as a punitive rather than a restorative mechanism,
especially given the current manner of imposing restitution unlinked to any
specific, identified gain, there is certainly an argument that restitution
should be subject to the strictures of the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi v.
New Jersey. 219 Those defendants who have been ordered to pay upwards of
$3,000,000 in restitution would undoubtedly consider the restitution to be
an additional punishment. As such, juries could be presented with the
evidence of economic gain or loss and asked to determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, what amount of restitution should be disgorged to the
child pornography victim as a result of a particular defendant’s crime.
Whatever methodology courts decide to employ, it should be
consistent and reliable, with no guessing or speculation. Using the existing
federal sentencing guidelines with regard to loss amount or requiring a jury
to ascertain the amount of restitution required are but two possible
approaches to calculating restitution in a manner that reimburses concrete
economic losses and stays away from the problems associated with our
current system of awarding restitution.
Employing these two steps would eliminate many of the concerns
about the current restitution system identified throughout this Article. This
taxonomy would ensure that restitution is only employed when an unjust
financial benefit is conferred, thereby eliminating the potential harms of
awarding untethered restitution. Courts would no longer be required to
guess the value of the harm experienced by a particular child pornography
victim. Instead, restitution would be imposed in a much more limited class
of cases, opening the way for legislators and courts to create better, more
effective methods of detecting, punishing, and deterring child sexual abuse.
2. Empowering Victims
Rethinking the current approach to restitution requires a shift in focus
from the misguided harms attributed to child pornography toward a better
methodology for detecting, punishing, and deterring child sexual abuse.
Recalibrating how the law addresses restitution does not mean losing sight
of the primary reason mandatory restitution first became required: giving
victims a greater voice and role in the criminal justice process. In fact, one
of the allures of the current “restitution” scheme is it appears to empower
victims. However, despite its intentions, the present system is set up in a
manner that often prevents victims from receiving satisfaction. To the
extent that victim satisfaction should be taken into account by the criminal
justice system—an assertion that certainly is open to debate—the two
proposals articulated below seek to improve the role of victims by
219

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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increasing their approval of the criminal justice process and ensuring that
the money awarded by the courts goes to them, rather than their lawyers or
experts. These proposals aim to reduce the possibility that child sexual
abuse victims will be further commodified by challenging the implicit
assumption that viewing child pornography is a greater harm than the abuse
that led to its creation and to highlight the harms that need addressing,
namely those created by child sexual abuse.
The first proposal would allow a court to consider a defendant’s
financial resources prior to imposing restitution. Continuing with the
previous framework, after a judge has determined that the loss is of an
economic nature and calculated the maximum possible restitution
according to whatever methodology courts have chosen, a final step before
imposing restitution could be reviewing a defendant’s ability to pay.
Although this proposal may seem unrelated to victim satisfaction, allowing
judges to consider a defendant’s financial capabilities in making a
restitution decision likely would increase not only offender compliance,220
an indisputable goal of the criminal justice system, but also victim
satisfaction. 221
220

BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL ., IMP ROVING ENFORCEMENT OF COURT-ORDERED
RESTITUTION , EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE VICTIM WITNESS PROJECT 3–4 (1989).
221
Restitution in its modern guise does not seem to have met one of the primary goals
identified by Congress in passing the legislative reforms of the 1980s and ’90s: increasing
victim satisfaction with the criminal justice system. Rather, the restitution regime may be
creating unrealistic expectations about what restitution can do for crime victims. See Carol
Shapiro, Is Restitution Legislation the Chameleon of the Victims’ Movement?, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE , RESTITUTION , AND RECONCILIATION 73, 76 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds.,
1990). M any believe restitution will help them regain a sense of control over their lives, see
Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, Victim Participation in Sentencing and Satisfaction with
Justice, 9 JUST. Q. 393, 394 (1992), when in fact it often does not. See also Henderson,
supra note 15, at 591–92. When restitution orders are imposed, many victims receive false
hope that they will receive the full amount of restitution ordered. R. BARRY RUBACK ET AL .,
CRIME , LAW , AND JUSTICE PROGRAM, PENN STATE UNIV., EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES
IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM COMP ENSATION O RDERS AND P AYMENTS 123 (2006); Dickman,
supra note 17, at 1698–99. As the cases of Amy and Vicky make abundantly clear, this is
far from the reality.
Statistics bear this out. Since the passage of the M VRA, the outstanding federal
criminal debt, which consists of unpaid fines, federal restitution, and nonfederal
restitution—restitution owed to victims of crime other than the federal government, but for
which the government maintains collection responsibility—has grown from $6 billion to
more than $64 billion, as of 2010. Criminal Restitution Improvement Act of 2006: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Rep. Coble, Chairman of the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.); U.S. GEN . ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO-04-388,
CRIMINAL DEBT: ACTIONS STILL NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE ’S
COLLECTION PROCESSES 7 (2004); U.S. GEN . ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL
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Prior to VAWA’s imposition of a mandatory restitution requirement,
judges were able to take a defendant’s ability to pay into consideration
before determining how much restitution to order, and both offender
compliance and victim satisfaction with restitution were higher than they
are now. The requirement that restitution be mandatory and ordered in “the
full amount” has had a negative impact across the board. The amount of
restitution ordered in many cases exceeds the defendant’s financial
capabilities, leaving many defendants with no ability to pay and “no
reasonable prospect of paying.” 222 In fact, restitution collection rates have
dropped precipitously since restitution became mandatory. 223
When “full restitution” is ordered but not received, the experience can
lead to unmet expectations, which often exacerbate a victim’s feelings of
DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION
PROCESSES 8 (2001); U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REP ORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at tbl.8c (2010) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REP ORT] (reporting $64,450,675,679.11 in outstanding criminal debt at the end
of fiscal year 2010); U.S. GEN . ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO-04-388, supra, at 1; Dickman,
supra note 17, at 1692. Of that $64 billion in unpaid restitution and fines, close to $51.5
billion, or approximately 80%, is from unpaid restitution to nongovernment victims. U.S.
DEP ’T OF JUSTICE , U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REP ORT, supra, at tbl.8b
(reporting a principal balance of $51,554,408,626.74 in nonfederal restitution at the end of
fiscal year 2010); U.S. GEN . ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO-04-388, supra, at 2–3 (revealing
that, as of 2002, nonfederal restitution accounted for 70% of federal criminal debt).
222
People v. Kay, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894, 896 (1973); Dickman, supra note 17, at 1704–05.
223
Prior to VAWA, debt collection rates from defendants ordered to pay restitution
ranged from 13.3% to 34% and 54%. The 13.3% figure is the rate of collection in the
federal system for fiscal year 1992, based on the collection amount divided by the total debt
owed. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ STATISTICAL REP ORT: FISCAL YEAR 1992, at tbl.12 (1992). The
34%–54% figure comes from state restitution programs, many of which considered an
offender’s ability to pay before ordering restitution. See Dickman, supra note 17, at 1694 &
n.53. Unsurprisingly, the rate of debt collection has dropped to a collection rate of 5% of
restitution owed to nongovernment victims as of fiscal year 2011. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE ,
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REP ORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at tbl.8 (2011) (derived
by dividing restitution payments received by total amount owed to third parties in
restitution). The Department of Justice has repeatedly acknowledged that the reason for this
decline is “the lack of relationship between the amount ordered and its corresponding
collectability,” attributable to VAWA and the M VRA’s requirement that judges not consider
the financial means of the offender when imposing restitution. Dickman, supra note 17, at
1694 (citing Letter from M ary Beth Buchanan, Dir. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Gary T. Engel, Dir. Fin. M gmt. and Assurance, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office (Jan. 13, 2005), in U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE , GAO-05-80,
CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY
COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 21 (2005)).
The result of so much unpaid restitution is that many victims end up feeling more
disempowered and disillusioned with the criminal justice system than they would if they
were given a realistic sense of how restitution works in practice. See RUBACK ET AL ., supra
note 221, at 123; Robert C. Davis et al., Restitution: The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUST. SYS. J.
746, 751–54 (1992).
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pain, anger, and resentment toward both the defendant and the criminal
justice system generally. 224
Unfulfilled expectations and further
disappointment, rather than alleviation of pain and suffering, are the result.
Rather than helping victims to feel as though the criminal justice system
has heard them and been responsive to their needs, the imposition of unpaid
restitution often results in their feeling unsatisfied, frustrated, and let down
by the system yet again.
Improving offender compliance and victim satisfaction can be
accomplished simultaneously. Social science studies have shown that
mandatory restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s losses is not
essential to victim satisfaction. 225 The percentage of a restitution award
paid by the defendant, regardless of the size of the award, leads to the
greatest victim satisfaction. 226 The greater the percentage of the award
paid, the greater the satisfaction, regardless of whether restitution has been
awarded in full. 227
This perspective challenges the current approach to restitution, which
presumes that receiving the maximum possible amount of compensation
will go the furthest toward helping victims recover from their abuse
experience. The present system continues to embrace the view that money
will help victims heal, which, taken to its extreme, has led to the existing
potential for commodification and the requirement that a victim prove the
depth of her pain in order to justify receiving a greater monetary award.
Likewise, the hyperfocus on being monetarily rewarded for her abuse
experience continues to send a strong message that the young woman’s
worth is in her body and the sexual acts in which she participated.
The subtle shift away from a strategy that emphasizes maximum
compensation and toward an approach that underscores greater compliance
in disgorging some portion of a defendant’s profits requires a significant
alteration in mindset. This move from a royalties-type approach to one that
acknowledges the deeper harms caused by the sexual abuse itself is
important, however, because it recognizes that the primary harm of child
pornography comes from the initial sexual abuse, without which child
224

Dickman, supra note 17, at 1698–99; Shapiro, supra note 221, at 76; Lorraine Slavin
& David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora’s Box—The Restitution Provisions of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 573 (1984); see also
Erez & Tontodonato, supra note 221, at 410–11 (stating that unfulfilled expectations with
regard to victim impact statements compound victim pain and anger and resentment toward
criminal justice experience).
225
Dickman, supra note 17, at 1697–98; Erez & Tontodonato, supra note 221, at 395,
407–10.
226
Davis et al., supra note 223, at 753–54; Dickman, supra note 17, at 1698.
227
Dickman, supra note 17, at 1698.
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pornography would not exist.
A second proposal involves creating a crime victim compensation
fund for child pornography victims. Criminal defendants convicted of any
type of child pornography offense could be required to pay a set amount
into a crime victim fund from which victims could then seek compensation
for losses incurred as a result of the offense. Allowing reimbursement
through a non-restitution system would allow for victim compensation in a
manner that does not involve guesstimating harm, thus eliminating one of
the primary sources of commodification.
Under a crime victim compensation fund system, as with the
aforementioned restitution framework, courts could require proof of losses
incurred in the form of receipts, pay stubs, and other documentation prior to
reimbursement. This would ensure that the victim already has incurred the
costs, and it would eliminate any uncertainty as to the amount to be
reimbursed.
Creating a victim compensation fund would also eliminate the need
for victims to hire attorneys, thereby further empowering victims. A
review of the restitution requests made on Amy and Vicky’s behalf reveals
a substantial amount of money being awarded to the lawyers in these cases.
In one recent case epitomizing this pattern, over half of the restitution
awarded went to Vicky’s attorney for lawyer’s fees. 228 If the goal of the
228

Opening Brief of Appellant, United States v. Benoit, No. 12-5013 (10th Cir. 2012),
2012 WL 1899100, at *47–48. Cause lawyering often raises an issue of whether the lawyer
is representing the cause in which she believes at the expense, both literal and figurative, of
her client, or zealously advocating what her client wants. See, e.g., M argareth Etienne, The
Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1196–97 (2005). The amount of
money the lawyers receive in each case through their representation of child pornography
victims certainly raises questions about who is choosing the course of action for these two
young women, and whether the lawyers are truly representing their clients’ wishes. This is
especially worrisome in light of the two young women’s repeated complaints about being
notified every time their images are located. See, e.g., United States v. Olivieri, No. 09-743
(WHW), 2012 WL 1118763, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012) (quoting Vicky’s psychologist
regarding “the distinct emotional trauma that arises from each notification of possession of
images of her abuse,” which she describes as a “slow acid drip”); United States v.
Lundquist, 847 F. Supp. 2d 364, 373 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that, according to Amy’s
psychologist, “it was primarily the fact that she received legal notifications of the
widespread presence of pornographic images of her . . . that caused her to regress”). As the
young women themselves have expressed both to their psychologists and in their requests
for restitution, receiving these notices anchors them in their abuse experiences. Id.
Although law enforcement provides a mechanism to opt out of receiving notices, see
FED . BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION , OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE , CHILD PORNOGRAP HY
VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (CPVA): A REFERENCE FOR VICTIMS AND PARENT/GUARDIAN OF
VICTIMS, available at www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/brochures-handouts/
cpva.pdf (last visited June 11, 2013), none of the young women seeking restitution have
elected to take this route, despite the trauma they experience from receiving such notices,
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current restitution system is for victims to be compensated for the harms
courts attribute to these defendants, giving more than half of the restitution
award to lawyers appears inconsistent with achieving this goal. A crime
victim compensation program would eliminate that issue.
Creating an alternate system of compensation allows for victims to be
reimbursed for losses they are incurring as a result of the emotional trauma
they have experienced both from the initial sexual abuse and the continued
circulation of their images, while also eliminating the problems created by
using the restitution system as the vehicle for compensation. It would also
mirror the conceptual shift away from seeking the maximum amount of
compensation toward an approach that recognizes the child sexual abuse
behind the pornography as the true harm and focuses instead on the
victims, their desires, and the complexities of recovering from sexual
abuse.
B. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ELIMINATING THE HARMS
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

By rejecting the restitution revolution and narrowing its scope,
restitution ceases to be a diversion that prevents law enforcement,
legislators, and courts from turning their efforts to more effective methods
of identifying, punishing, and deterring the child sexual abuse that is
behind every child pornography image. The previous Subpart suggests
changes to the current method of imposing restitution that may better serve
to identify and address the underlying harms of child sexual abuse. This
next Subpart moves beyond restitution and recommends modifications to
statutes and sentencing guidelines, with the goal of targeting child sexual
abuse and reducing the harms identified in Part II.
As indicated previously, courts commonly refer to eliminating the
market for child pornography images as a primary goal of imposing
restitution. 229 Although it is appealing to believe that removing individual
child pornography viewers from the community through the imposition of
increasingly harsh punishments will lead to the elimination of the child
pornography market, such punitive approaches are unlikely to have much
likely because those notifications are now linked to a major source of income for a few of
them. If Amy or Vicky do not receive the notifications, they cannot file restitution requests
that may continue to result in orders for hundreds of millions of dollars to be paid to them
directly. In fact, fairly recently, Vicky’s lawyer indicated that due to a glitch in the system,
she had not been receiving these notices; they have now fixed the problem and for some
period of time, she and her staff were working through a backlog of notices as they sought
to determine in which cases to seek restitution. Corrected Appendix of Appellant Shawn
Crawford vol. 2, at 143–44, United States v. Crawford, No. 11-5544 (6th Cir. Aug. 23,
2011).
229
See supra Part II.A.
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impact, as this country’s experience with the drug war has shown. 230 As
one judge opined, “I wish it were that simple.” 231 Instead, more concrete
approaches focusing on the detection and prevention of child sexual abuse
can begin to pave the way toward eliminating the harms caused by
imposing restitution on non-contact child pornography offenders.
A necessary first step in reducing the child pornography market is to
focus on detection of and increased punishments for individuals who
engage in the actual hands-on sexual abuse of children, which means
entering the uncomfortable realm of family dysfunction. Although there
has been an increased public focus on incest and intrafamilial sexual
violence over the past thirty years, the reluctance to get involved in private
“family matters” lingers. Despite the best of intentions, the public and law
enforcement remain reluctant to confront child sexual abuse, especially
when the abuse is occurring within the family and even when the abuse is
“definite.” 232 The legal system’s treatment of child sexual abuse reflects
this hesitance.
Yet if we truly want to eliminate the market for child pornography, the
importance of intervening in family affairs cannot be overestimated,
especially since more than 96% of child pornography victims already know
the individual producing the pornography. Public health officials have
engaged in efforts aimed at preventing child sexual abuse before it happens
and have identified three primary targets: the victim, the offender, and
bystanders. 233 Victim-focused strategies try to equip the potential victim
230

United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Iowa 2009);
Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing, supra note 12, at 571.
231
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
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Critics have long noted a reluctance on the part of individuals and the legal system to
get involved in family dynamics. See, e.g., David Finkelhor & Patricia Y. Hashima, The
Victimization of Children and Youth: A Comprehensive Overview, in HANDBOOK OF YOUTH
AND J USTICE 49, 71–72 (Susan O. White ed., 2001); Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives
on Family Violence, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 523 (1987) (citing Roger M cIntire, Parenthood
Training or Mandatory Birth Control: Take Your Choice, PSYCHOL . T ODAY , Oct. 1973, at
36). The primary reason cited is a belief in family privacy. Zimring, supra, at 523. A recent
study confirmed a general reluctance to get involved in a case of clear child abuse.
Although the vast majority of people interviewed (91%) declared they would intervene in a
child sexual abuse situation if the abuse was “definite,” of those participants who already
had been confronted with a believed case of abuse, far fewer actually intervened. STOP IT
NOW !, supra note 159, at 8. Sixty-five percent intervened—37% called the police, 18%
confronted the adult or child. Id. A fairly large percentage (22%) did nothing. Id.
The number of people willing to report or confront abuse when it was only
“suspected” was even lower. Id. If abuse was suspected outside the family, the percentage
of people who stated they would call law enforcement was 50%, with half as many
indicating they would confront the suspected abuser. Id. If abuse was suspected within the
family, only a relatively small percentage indicated a willingness to get involved. Id.
233
Sexual Violence: Prevention Strategies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
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with knowledge, awareness, and self-defense skills in order to reduce
risk. 234 Offender-based approaches aim to reduce risk factors that might
encourage an individual to sexually offend. 235 Bystander prevention
strategies target social norms supporting sexual violence and seek to
empower people to intervene with peers to prevent assaults from
occurring. 236
Although these strategies are important in helping to identify instances
of child sexual abuse, the law also has a significant role to play in deterring
and preventing further abuse. In order to complement the public health and
social science strategies currently in place, this Article recommends a tiered
system of punishments in child sexual abuse cases, with increased
punishments for those who commit hands-on sexual offenses involving
children and decreased punishments for those who commit non-contact
child pornography offenses. As already indicated, one of the harms of the
existing approach to child pornography is its diversion of resources and
attention away from those who have a greater risk of harming children to
those who are relatively low risk. In order to fundamentally recalibrate the
system and debunk the stranger-danger myth, the balance between sexual
abuse and viewing pornography must be shifted. Treating the two types of
offenses as equivalent does not go far enough. If legislators and courts
continue to misdirect resources toward the relatively low-risk child
pornography viewers, child sexual abuse and the production of new child
pornography images will continue unabated. Only by redirecting the
current focus on child pornography toward the elimination of child sexual
abuse can we begin to reduce the market for child pornography.
As an initial matter, one straightforward way to combat child sexual
abuse is to increase the punishments for such abusers. As discussed
previously, the disparity between the punishments for those convicted of
non-contact child pornography offenses and those convicted of molesting
and raping children is significant at both the federal and state levels. 237
Upwardly adjusting the punishments for child sexual abuse to reflect the
relative seriousness of those offenses would be a good starting point. In
addition, creating greater sanctions for intrafamilial child sexual abuse
based on the abuse of trust involved, especially in the event of “extreme
PREVENTION , www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/sexualviolence/prevention.html (last visited
M ar. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Sexual Violence].
234
Id.; Sandy K. Wurtele, Behavioral Approaches to Educating Young Children and
Their Parents About Child Sexual Abuse Prevention, 1 J. BEHAV. ANALYSIS OFFENDER &
VICTIM T REATMENT & PREVENTION 1, 52, 54, 59 (2008).
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and repetitive” abuse, also would serve to reorder the current system. 238
Amending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and state sentencing
schemes to reflect the greater harms of child sexual abuse also would be an
effective deterrent. Sentencing guidelines could be amended to allow for
an enhancement in the case of incest or in a case of “extreme and
repetitive” abuse. Sentencing guideline ranges could be recalculated to
increase the range of punishments applicable to child sexual abusers and
decrease those applicable to viewers and traders of child pornography.
These changes would reflect the seriousness of the danger and harm child
sexual abuse causes.
At the same time, a reduction in the more politically popular but less
empirically sound practices currently in vogue, such as mandatory
minimum prison sentences in child pornography cases, would signal that
sexual abuse is a greater harm than viewing pornographic images.
Numerous voices already have come out in favor of eliminating the
imbalance between contact and non-contact offenses and, specifically, of
reducing punishments for non-contact child pornography offenses. In fact,
several federal judges have expressed discomfort with what they perceive
to be unreasonably excessive penalties in child pornography cases. 239
In light of these criticisms, the United States Sentencing Commission
recently submitted a lengthy report to Congress urging reconsideration of
the statutory and guideline sentencing options for non-production child
pornography cases. 240 Among the recommendations it makes in the report,
238

Zimring, supra note 232, at 533.
See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 182–89 (2d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 603–10 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516,
533 (6th Cir. 2009) (M erritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009); United
States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 703 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Sentencing
M emorandum at 17, United States v. Lung, No. 1:09-CR-182-JEC (N.D. Ga. M ay 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Sentencing M emorandum, Lung].
One district judge specifically noted the “irrationality of a [sentencing] scheme that
would send somebody to jail for a longer period of time for just looking at something than
somebody who actually crossed state lines and actually wanted to harm a child. That is not
terribly rational under any scheme.” Sentencing M emorandum, Lung, supra, at 17.
Likewise, a survey of district judges across the country in 2010 revealed that 69% believe
the recommended sentencing guideline range for receipt of child pornography is too high,
and 70% find the same with regard to possession of child pornography. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N , RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 TO
M ARCH 2010, at tbl.8 (2010).
240
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N , FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 325–30 (2012),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_
Testimony_and_Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_
Offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf (recommending that Congress reconsider the
disparate treatment between possession and receipt of child pornography, and lower the
mandatory minimum for such offenses in the event Congress decides to keep a mandatory
239
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the Sentencing Commission suggests amending the applicable guideline
range for offenders with a history of hands-on sexual offenses,241
considering the possibility of eliminating the mandatory minimum sentence
in possession and receipt of child pornography cases,242 and reconsidering
the use of some of the heartland sentencing enhancements for child
pornography offenses, such as viewing the images on a computer or using a
file-sharing network to distribute images. 243
These voices advocate a step in the right direction, but they do not go
far enough. Rather, a system that reflects the relative severity of child
sexual abuse requires the maximum sentence and applicable guideline
range for an offender convicted of a hands-on sexual offense involving a
child to be significantly greater than that of an offender convicted of a noncontact child pornography offense. 244 This means not only eliminating
both mandatory minimums in non-contact child pornography offenses and
some of the heartland sentencing enhancements for child pornography
offenses, but also recalibrating the maximum sentences in child sexual
abuse and non-contact cases to reflect the greater harms of hands-on
offenses; adjusting offense levels so that sentencing guideline ranges reflect
the relative harms of the two types of offenses; and adding enhancements to
the child sexual abuse guidelines for incest or repeated and extreme abuse.
Congress, the Commission, and courts, as they create, interpret, and
apply laws addressing sex offenses, also should ensure they avoid falling
prey to the sex-predator narrative. This narrative does not mirror the reality
of child sex offenders and serves only to divert attention and resources
from strategies that accurately identify those individuals who pose a threat
to children. Although shifting the language may be a challenge because it
means acknowledging that perpetrators of child sexual abuse may be
people who are friends and family, the only way child sexual abuse will be
diminished is if the legal system accurately identifies the threat and focuses
resources and laws on diminishing that threat.
The way the law is currently structured suggests that viewing
pornography is a greater harm than the underlying abuse. That construction
minimum at all, and recommending that Congress revise the penalty structure to
differentiate “distribution” using file sharing networks from more traditional conceptions of
“distribution” not involving such technologies).
241
Id. at 320, 324–25.
242
Id. at 326–29.
243
Id. at 313, 323–24, 329.
244
Cf. Troy Stabenow, A Method for Careful Study: A Proposal for Reforming the Child
Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED . SENT’G REP . 108, 109–10, 129 (2011) (discussing district
court dissatisfaction with guideline sentencing options for child pornography offenses,
especially when compared with sentences for contact offenses).
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distracts us from the fact that if there is no initial abuse, there is no
continued harm. Instead, it keeps the focus on child pornography rather
than the child sexual abuse that necessarily precedes the creation of
pornography. Amending the law on restitution, child abuse offenses, and
child pornography offenses is a necessary step toward moving the focus
toward the child sexual abuse that is the most significant harm of child
pornography.
IV. CONCLUSION
Restitution has long been used to balance the scales after an
inequitable shifting of financial benefits from one party to another.
Although it is tempting to want to expand this equitable remedy to more
broadly defined categories of benefits and losses, restitution as it is being
applied in the non-contact child pornography context has gone too far. As
several commentators have noted, “In the last few decades, Congress has
embraced a political culture of fear that is increasingly intent on throwing
the book at child pornography offenders.” 245 Instead of being used to
restore an unjustified economic gain, restitution is being used as a
mechanism that encourages courts to punish defendants for actions they
find morally offensive.
The desire to make things right for the young women depicted in child
pornography by compensating them for the pain they have experienced is
understandable, and, from the perspective of the young woman, money can
be a way to make her feel better and more in control of her world.
However, restitution is not the answer. Restitution does not address the
harms to the young women depicted in the child pornography images and,
instead, can serve to exacerbate those harms. In fact, employing restitution
in this manner has diverted us from the more significant problem of child
sexual abuse and allowed us to avoid the discomfort associated with
confronting incest and intrafamilial sexual abuse. As a result, legislators
and courts have created a system that is less about deterrence and
punishment of those at a high risk of sexually abusing children and more
about our uneasiness with family dysfunction. A nuanced and carefully
calibrated approach to child pornography cases is needed in order to reduce
occurrences of child sexual abuse and the child pornography that results
from the recording of such abuse.
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